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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property is today thought to be principally of
statutory origin. Discussions of the subject invariably revolve around a
close scrutiny of the federal statutes involved. Indeed, the frequency
with which Congress amends the patent and copyright statutes seems
to leave little doubt that it alone determines intellectual property's
precise content and coverage.' Nevertheless, there exists a rather
robust body of state law that is almost entirely the creation of state
courts and is directed at creating entitlements in information, ideas,
expression, goodwill, one's image, and other related intangibles. These
rights regimes are in turn collectively referred to as "common law
intellectual property."2 Examples include the right of publicity, unfair
1. As of 2004, Congress had amended the Copyright Act of 1976 about forty-eight times.
See 17 U.S.C.A. et seq. (West 2010); David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51
UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1299-315 (2004) (listing and evaluating these various amendments).
The Patent Act of 1952 has similarly been amended thirty-nine times since its enactment. See 35
U.S.C.A. et seq. (West 2010).
2. Use of this phrase to describe this set of rights is somewhat uncommon among scholars.
For the earliest use of the term see Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the
Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 411 (1983); see
also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
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competition, common law copyright, trade secrets, misappropriation,
common law idea protection, and passing off.
While each of these regimes covers a distinct intangible, they
all share the same structural characteristics. 3 Each originates in a
cause of action that is grounded in tort, contract, or unjust enrichment
and is tailored to the circumstances under which protection is deemed
necessary. Unlike the one-size-fits-all federal copyright and patent
statutes, these regimes allow courts to adopt a far more nuanced
approach to intellectual property protection. Instead of relying on a
single overarching theory to justify protection, courts look to the
practical needs of a particular area, recognize multiple values as
relevant for consideration there, and then adopt a highly contextual
approach to protection, one best described as "antifoundational."
Additionally, the common law method that they employ develops the
law incrementally, recognizing the need for caution in a rapidly
changing social and technological environment, and allowing future
courts to extend, limit, or at times altogether deny protection when
circumstance and context change. I call this method of adjudication
and rule development "pragmatic incrementalism," in that it exhibits
the characteristics of both legal pragmatism and common law
incrementalism.
Several of these common law regimes are almost as old as their
statutory counterparts, if not older.4 Yet, for decades now, many have
voiced their skepticism about the usefulness of these rights, especially
in light of congressional activity in the area.5 Justice Louis Brandeis
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 150-52 (1992) (discussing the shift towards state court creation of
common law intellectual property rights); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public
Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 796 (2006) (describing the "right of publicity" as a common law
intellectual property right); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to
Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 322 n.106 (2004) (asserting that
courts rarely find common law intellectual property rights to be preempted unless a conflict
exists between the right and statutory copyright interests). Interestingly, a Westlaw search
revealed that no more than five courts have ever used the phrase, independent of citing to
Baird's article.
3. This by no means implies that these regimes do not bleed into each other, for they very
often do. See Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1113-18 (1977) (noting the
connections between common law copyright, misappropriation, privacy rights, and the law of
ideas).
4. Common law copyright, for instance, dates back to the period surrounding the passage
of the first copyright law, the Statute of Anne. Shortly after the Statute, courts came to recognize
the existence of copyright at common law, independent of the Statute, and unfettered by any
restrictions (temporal or otherwise) imposed on copyright by the Statute. See, e.g., Millar v.
Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 217-19, 225-29; see also infra Section I.B (discussing the
common law evolution of publicity rights that were later recognized by state statutes).
5. See Baird, supra note 2, at 411 (examining this skepticism).
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and Judge Learned Hand, both outspoken champions of the common
law in other contexts, were well-known skeptics of common law
intellectual property.6 They feared that allowing courts to create and
develop intellectual property rights would result in the overprotection
of information, thereby impeding free speech and allied interests.
More recently, Douglas Baird has argued that, while common law
intellectual property has done little to impede the free flow of
information, its deep flaw nonetheless lies in having courts choose
among competing analogies to develop the law.7 Since each analogy
emphasizes a different value, Baird argues that courts are hard-
pressed to choose effectively among them.
On closer examination, however, these objections are myopic.
In focusing entirely on the issue of judicial competence, they disregard
the structural and substantive advantages that accompany common
law rulemaking in intellectual property, all of which are borne out by
the continuing vitality of these regimes. The method of pragmatic
incrementalism that courts have come to employ emphasizes a
cautionary, context-sensitive approach to intellectual property
development. The extensive situational tailoring and modification that
this incrementalism brings about adequately safeguards the process
against the possibility of overprotection. Besides, recent developments
in the federal arena have also cast serious doubt on claims of
legislatures' superior competence in intellectual property lawmaking.
In particular, the federal copyright and patent systems are in a state
of crisis. Congress has repeatedly extended the term and coverage of
copyright protection, often bereft of any reason other than pure
industry rent seeking, prompting calls for radical reform.8 So too, the
6. Justice Brandeis's objections are best seen in his dissenting opinion in the Supreme
Court case of International News Service v. Associated Press, dealing with common law
misappropriation, where he notes how courts are "ill-equipped" to undertake this task and that
"resort to legislation" was preferable whenever the competing interests were extremely complex.
248 U.S. 215, 263, 267 (1918). For Judge Hand's criticisms of common law intellectual property,
see Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records, Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority's creation of common law interests is too expansive and
defeats the purpose of uniformity); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir.
1929) (observing how the creation of common law interests "would flagrantly conflict with the
scheme which Congress has for more than a century devised to cover the subject-matter").
7. Baird, supra note 2, at 428-29.
8. See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 49-51 (2008) (arguing that the movement
towards extending copyright protections proceeded "with little argument and less evidence" and
pointing out that the trend is "a vote of no confidence in the productive powers of the commons");
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD
250-51 (2001) (explaining that copyright law has increased in scope to automatically protect
ideas for the life of the author plus seventy five years and advocating for shorter copyright
protections where the author must publish and renew a copyright to prevent it from becoming
publicly available); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 54-56 (tracing the
1546 [Vol. 63:6:1543
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patent system seems to be stifling rather than stimulating innovation
in a variety of different areas. 9 Unsurprisingly, scholars have begun
calling for fundamental changes to the patent system as well.10
Despite all of this, reform efforts have met with little success as a
consequence of the interest group gridlock that is endemic to most
congressional efforts. Few, if any, have turned to courts and the
common law for solutions in recent times."
Baird's concern that courts are hard-pressed to choose between
different analogies also underappreciates the significance of
antifoundational decisionmaking, a core feature of pragmatic
incrementalism. Rather than relying on a single foundational theory
for the regime, the process requires courts to balance several
competing values as they relate to a particular context. In other
words, the very selection of an "appropriate" analogy from among
several options forces courts to confront and recognize as legitimate a
multiplicity of goals and interests for the institutionl 2-a strong virtue
of analogical reasoning in the law. 13
What exactly is intellectual property law trying to achieve? For
decades now, courts, scholars, and legislators have struggled to
articulate a coherent theory of intellectual property.14 These
historical expansion of copyright and arguing that some aspects of the expansion are
troublesome and exceed the scope of what is necessary to promote creativity) (2008).
9. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 10-16 (2008) (suggesting that many
industries would be better off without a patent system because, although for each individual the
private benefits of a patent exceeds the cost of obtaining it, the collective costs that a patent
imposes on other innovators outweighs the marginal incentive to innovate that patent protection
spurs); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE
IT 30-31(2009) (explaining that the current patent system "may do more harm than good to
innovation, because the assertion and litigation of too many bad patents against companies that
make innovative products ends up rising their costs and reducing their innovation more than the
existence of those patents spurs new innovation").
10. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 27; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 9, at 37.
11. A notable exception to this is the recent work by Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, who
advocate a common law approach to patent reform. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 9, at 104.
12. Baird, supra note 2, at 428-29.
13. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 41 (1996) (observing
how analogical reasoning allows courts to decide cases without reference to abstract theory,
thereby allowing multiple values and conflicting interests to coexist in the law as a whole); Cass
R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 743 (1993) ("[A]nalogical
reasoning has important advantages over general theories, because those who use analogies are
especially attuned to the diverse and plural goods that are at stake in legal and ethical
decisions."); see also Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1179, 1196-97 (1999) (pointing out the epistemic and institutional advantages of reasoning
by analogy).
14. See, e.g., William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL
AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 176-93 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (discussing the
gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities surrounding the four perspectives that dominate theoretical
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theories-principally normative in orientation-propose a unifying
principle for a regime and then explicate that principle in different
parts of the law. They prize consistency and coherence across time and
context. In the process though, they either classify deviations as
anomalies or creatively reinterpret them as being driven indirectly by
the same unifying principle. The diversity of scholarship that follows
this pattern captures the pervasiveness of this phenomenon. To law
and economics scholars, such as William Landes and Richard Posner,
the entire field of intellectual property law is driven by a core concern
for promoting economic efficiency, minimizing transaction costs, and
providing creators with an incentive to create. 15 To libertarians, such
as Richard Epstein, intellectual property law is in the end about
"property" and therefore imbued with classical liberal values. 16 Others
have made similar claims about specific types of intellectual property.
Jane Ginsburg, for instance, has long argued that copyright law is
about "authorship" and the centrality of authorial control over creative
works.17 In a similar vein, Roberta Kwall has argued that copyright
law should be understood as a mechanism to protect the intrinsic
dimension of creativity-the morality of authorship.' 8 Regardless of
ideology, the search for a grand theory continues to dominate the
intellectual property landscape.19
Normative coherence, however, does not require a single
overarching value, or indeed even a finite set of values. It can at once
acknowledge the incommensurability of the various values involved
and strive to accommodate them institutionally. For centuries now,
the common law method has done just this, enabling it to
accommodate and affirm a host of otherwise conflicting values through
a process of practical reasoning. And indeed common law intellectual
property regimes build on this basic feature of the common law, an
attribute that its detractors ignore.
Much of the skepticism about common law intellectual property
derives from the prevalent discontent today with the common law
writing about intellectual property: Utilitarianism, Labor Theory, Personality Theory, and Social
Planning Theory).
15. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003).
16. Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 456, 520-21 (2010).
17. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1091-92 (2003).
18. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW
FOR THE UNITED STATES, at xiii-xviii (2010).
19. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 260 (2006) (noting the absence of
"giant-sized" theories of intellectual property and observing that "there should be" such theories).
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method.20 The common law, its skeptics argue, emerged in a much
simpler world, where the law focused more on resolving disputes and
less on guiding parties in their future actions.21 In today's complex
world, sophisticated parties need greater certainty and ex ante
guidance, rather than nuanced lawmaking. Certainty, however, has
its own costs. Given that creativity and innovation are almost always
sequential, 22 any regime has to balance not just exclusionary control
and the public benefit, but also the incentives for a primary creator
and a secondary creator. No bright-line ex ante regime can anticipate
the nature and forms of creativity at both ends and balance them
optimally for all times to come. In certain contexts, then, situational
flexibility may be more valuable than the certainty derived from
inadequate information.
The method of pragmatic incrementalism that courts follow in
common law intellectual property builds on this recognition and
avoids several of the major pitfalls that have plagued the federal
intellectual property regimes. Courts here remain aware of the
intertemporal problems inherent in granting plaintiffs open-ended,
property-like exclusionary control over an intangible. Consequently,
courts have developed techniques to avoid these problems and
mitigate their effects-proceeding with caution, balancing multiple
values or interests, looking to the context and necessities of an area to
tailor a rule, and paying close attention to the actual practical
consequences that flow from a rule so as to reformulate it when
needed. Incrementalism, flexibility, and contextuality are thus central
to the way in which these rights are developed and applied, but are
features that courts operating under the statutory regimes today have
struggled to implement. Yet, hardly anyone has thought it wise to look
to the common law and state intellectual property regimes for
structural and substantive guidance. If change in intellectual property
law is to move beyond being just rhetoric, it needs to be creative and
20. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765,
781-82 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, Common Law] (describing the process through which this
skepticism developed, and contributing to it); see also Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad
Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 917-18 (2006) [hereinafter Schauer, Bad Law] (suggesting that
case-based rulemaking that is dependent on concrete facts may have distorting qualities).
21. Schauer, Common Law, supra note 20, at 781.
22. This reality is often described as the "on the shoulders of giants" effect. YOCHAI
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND
FREEDOM 37 (2006); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1109 (1990) (describing intellectual property as derivative because "[e]ach advance stands
on building blocks fashioned by prior thinkers"); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders
of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 40 (1991) (discussing




include options that are now ignored for no reason other than sheer
path dependence. In this Article, I argue that looking to common law
intellectual property regimes ought to figure prominently in that set of
options.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the idea of
common law intellectual property by providing a brief overview of the
more popular regimes, focusing on their common law genesis and use
of ideas from contract, tort, and restitution law to simulate the
functioning of property rights. Part II describes the theory and
practice of pragmatic incrementalism in common law intellectual
property. It begins by looking to the connection between common law
incrementalism, decisional minimalism, and legal pragmatism to
disaggregate four practical attributes of pragmatic incrementalism: (1)
the use of caution in the face of uncertainty; (2) the use of
semantically value-neutral language; (3) the use of custom to shape
the scope and breadth of a rule; and (4) the emphasis on balancing a
rule's consequences (the ex ante) with its application (the ex post).
Part II then examines how common law intellectual property regimes
make use of the attributes of pragmatic incrementalism, drawing on
examples and illustrations from the regimes of Part I.
Part III extrapolates lessons from the workings of these
regimes and their use of pragmatic incrementalism for intellectual
property reform. This Part focuses on the use of courts and the
common law process as unappreciated alternatives to legislatures and
statutes. It looks to the value of eclecticism and practical reasoning as
substantive alternatives to grand theorization.
Part IV anticipates and addresses possible objections to the
working of pragmatic incrementalism. Specifically, it addresses
arguments that the model of pragmatic incrementalism is inherently
"conservative" and unlikely to bring about genuine change, that it
ignores the virtues of federalism and uniformity, and that it pays
insufficient attention to the systemic deficiencies of the common law.
Part V then tests the discussion and analysis of pragmatic
incrementalism by applying it to the fashion industry, an area where
scholars and legislators are currently debating the need for
intellectual property protection. It shows how the debates have
ignored the possibility of a common law solution to tailor protection to
the needs of the industry, while avoiding the costs associated with
such protection. While Parts I and II are largely positive in their
analysis, Parts III, IV, and V are primarily normative.
It is worth emphasizing that I am not arguing for the
replacement of all statutory intellectual property regimes with
common law alternatives. My normative claims in this Article are two-
1550 [Vol. 63:6:1543
COMMON LAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
fold. First, that some forms of informational resources, to the extent
that they merit protection at all, would benefit from a common law
approach to protection. Discussions of institutional design in
intellectual property have thus far paid little attention to the potential
benefits of the common law. Thinking creatively, scholars and
policymakers ought to recognize the viability of common law
protection as an alternative to one-size-fits-all statutory approaches.
Second, even within the world of federal statutory intellectual
property, courts should understand a larger number of statutory
provisions as actively delegating lawmaking power to them. Federal
courts should embrace pragmatic incrementalism in intellectual
property protection whenever needed, and be far less dogmatic about
deferring to Congress for guidance.
My choice of state common law regimes to explicate the
functioning of pragmatic incrementalism is certainly not to contrast
state law with federal law. Neither is it directed at showing that the
trademark, copyright, and patent regimes have consciously disavowed
any reliance on the common law method. Several features of
pragmatic incrementalism may indeed be found in the functioning of
parts of the federal intellectual property regimes, even though the
overlay of statutory regulations and administrative rules has resulted
in the common law-like parts receding in importance. Rather, this
choice is to illustrate how courts are well equipped to develop rules for
intellectual property in the absence of direction from legislatures and
the process by which they can continue to do so in coordination with
legislative intervention that takes their lawmaking role seriously. The
fact that most common law in the United States is today state law
rather than federal law is thus a descriptive reality that this choice
represents, rather than a prescriptive one. I leave for future work a
fuller discussion of how the federal regimes might do well to integrate
common law rule development into their framework and functioning,
and indeed the costs and benefits that this might entail.
I. COMMON LAW REGIMES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: AN OVERVIEW
Common law intellectual property has thus far received little
systematic analysis. While scholars have long studied individual
common law regimes to understand their place in the overall
intellectual property framework, 23 hardly anyone has sought to
23. Indeed, treatises have been written analyzing several common law intellectual property
regimes independently. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY
(2d ed. 2009); ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS (2009).
15512010]
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examine the one unifying factor that connects these different
regimes-their genesis in the common law. What does it mean for an
intellectual property regime to have originated in the common law?
First, it implies that judicial decisions are the principal source
of legal rules for the regime. The common law is judge-made law.2 4
This is not the same as statutory interpretation, where judges fill gaps
in a statutory enactment. In the common law, the absence of
legislation is seen as an active delegation of lawmaking power to
courts. Courts extrapolate rules and principles from their prior
decisions, applying them to the specific dispute at hand. In the
process, the court fashions a new rule or exception by drawing from
disparate areas of tort, contract, restitution, and property law-
relying entirely on logic and experience. 25
In an effort to harmonize the law across different states, some
state legislatures have codified these common law intellectual
property regimes.26 This process has impeded courts' ability to rely
exclusively on case law as their source of rules. Nonetheless, courts
continue to develop the law as needed, often independent of the
statutes, and in the traditional, if somewhat attenuated, common law
method. Courts work in tandem with legislatures in these contexts,
retaining a secondary, but significant, role.
Second, the idea of intellectual property in these regimes is
intricately connected to the concept of common law property. Common
law property interests revolve around the idea of exclusion and use a
variety of mechanisms to render it operational.27 Since the common
24. See Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455, 455 (1989)
("[C]ommon law rules are not made by legislatures; they are created by courts simultaneously
with the application of those rules to concrete cases.").
25. For some prominent work on the common law process, see generally BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 1-3, 11 (1924) (referencing the strengths and weaknesses of
the common law and describing the need for a restatement to provide certainty of the law and
the need for a philosophy of law as an aid to growth); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 16 (1960) (identifying and discussing fourteen factors that
regularly have bearing on how common law is made through the decision of appellate cases);
ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, at xi-xiv (1921) (discussing the history and
power of the common law in the Anglo-American system); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897) (addressing the reality that "in societies like ours
the command of the public force is intrusted to the judges in certain cases, and the whole power
of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees").
26. This is most prominent in the context of trade secrets and publicity rights. See infra text
accompanying notes 41-43, 53-55.
27. For accounts of the "right to exclude" in property law, including common law property,
see generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property,
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593 (2008) (arguing that
the right to exclude has always done more than provide an entitlement to injunctive relief in that
it imposes a duty on the world to stay away from an ownable resource); Thomas W. Merrill,
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law process involves a bilateral dispute, common law property
interests are ordinarily relational. In other words, they originate in
actions alleging an interference with a pre-existing interest, and in
adjudicating the interference, courts determine the nature and
existence of the interest alleged to have been interfered with.
For long, the only reason the distinction between property and
nonproperty interests mattered was that courts refused to grant
injunctions for nonproprietary interests. 28 Once equity relaxed this
rule, the distinction ceased to be of much significance. Many of what
are today termed "common law property interests" originated in
tortious, contractual, or quasi-contractual settings.29 They continue to
be called "property" interests because they convey an ex ante
possibility of exclusion in certain situations. Thus, trespassory action
is ordinarily referred to as a property action even though exclusion is
tied to a defendant's actions (that is, the wrong); the same is true of
common law intellectual property regimes. The idea of "property" here
is subsidiary to the context within which the interest originates, which
tends to be either contractual (where rights and duties are determined
by parties themselves) or tortious (where rights and duties are
prescribed by law). In relation to trade, secrets, perhaps the most
robust common law intellectual property form today, Justice Holmes
famously remarked:
The word "property" . . . is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences
of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith.
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts,
whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be
denied, but the confidence cannot be. Therefore, the starting point of the present matter
is not property . . . but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the
plaintiffs .... 30
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998) (discussing why the right to
exclude is fundamental to the concept property); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 358-60 (2001) (describing
property as a "bundle of rights" including the right to exclude, which places a duty of abstention
on the world).
28. See Balganesh, supra note 27, at 642-43 (discussing how courts formerly turned to
equitable remedies to protect property, resorting to injunctive relief); Roscoe Pound, Equitable
Relief Against Defamation and Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 640-48 (1916) (discussing this
difference and noting its artificiality).
29. The recent doctrine of 'cybertrespass' is one such example. See Richard A. Epstein,
Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 79-82 (2003) (discussing how courts have applied common
law chattel trespass doctrines to the Internet); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Common Law Property
Metaphors on the Internet: The Real Problem with the Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 12 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 265, 314-22 (2006) (discussing the problems inherent in extending
trespass to chattels to the Internet using cybertrespass).
30. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
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In other words, the idea of property as used in the context of
trade secrets is largely relational. The right to exclude originates in a
very specific set of circumstances, and identifying these unique
circumstances remains the law's principal concern. The same is true,
in various shades, of almost all forms of common law intellectual
property, often bringing into question their very classification as
"property." The relational nature of these interests also reduces the
social costs associated with exclusionary (that is, monopoly) control.
Since exclusion operates only in a very limited set of circumstances,
these regimes effectively minimize the static and dynamic
inefficiencies traditionally associated with property rights in
nonrivalrous and nonexcludable resources. 31
The remainder of this Part provides a concise summary of some
of the more prominent common law intellectual property regimes. My
principal objective here is to illustrate how their common law origin
influences their structure and functioning.
A. Trade Secrets: Between Property, Tort, and Contract
Trade secret law, which protects valuable information, is a
combination of common law contract, property, and tort principles. A
trade secret claim ordinarily involves three elements: (1) the subject
matter of protection must be information of economic value to a
plaintiff; (2) the holder of the information must have taken reasonable
precautions to prevent its disclosure (also known as the "secrecy
requirement"); and (3) the secret needs to have been
misappropriated-that is, improperly acquired, used, or disclosed. 32
Causes of action for the misappropriation of trade secrets date
back to mid-nineteenth century state common law.33 The law of trade
secrets, as Mark Lemley notes, originated in the interconnection of
31. For an overview of these inefficiencies, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 13
(discussing how traditional property rights are inefficient because they do not incentivize
creation or improvement to develop future benefits).
32. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 37 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the definition of a trade secret);
see also Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)-1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
33. See, e.g., Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523, 527 (1837) (upholding a contractual
agreement involving sale of an exclusive trade secret). Some scholars trace it back to Roman law.
See A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 837, 840-45 (1930) (arguing that Roman businessmen were protected against unfair
competition through the legal action of actio servi corrupti or "action for making a slave worse").
Others have called into question any connection between trade secrets and Roman law. See Alan
Watson, Trade Secrets and Roman Law: The Myth Exploded, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 19, 19
(1996) (stating that "there is not the slightest evidence" that actio servi corrupti was ever used as
Schiller suggests).
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many common law doctrines: breach of confidence, breach of
confidentiality, common law misappropriation, unfair competition,
unjust enrichment, and trespass. 34 Courts then restructured this as a
tort governing business relationships, and eventually the law of trade
secrets emerged. 35
As a result of borrowing from multiple areas, the underlying
theoretical basis of trade secret law remains unclear. Early courts
often spoke of trade secrets as property interests.36 By the mid-
twentieth century, this had shifted, and courts came to view trade
secret law as a branch of tort law, originating in a defendant's bad-
faith behavior.37 Eventually, the dominant view shifted to
understanding trade secret law as a combination of contract and
property principles. 38 To this day, scholars disagree on the area's
theoretical underpinnings.39 Some go so far as to argue that the
34. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 316 (2008).
35. Id.
36. This view developed largely for instrumental purposes-to avoid the restriction being
termed a restraint on trade, or to allow for injunctive relief. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass.
452, 457 (1868) (granting injunctive relief to an entrepreneur whose trade secret was stolen by a
former employee and stating that "[i]f a man establishes a business and makes it valuable by his
skill and attention, the good will of that business is recognized by the law as property"). For an
elaborate analysis of this phenomenon, see Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law:
Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 253-55 (1998) (suggesting that courts
formalistically converted trade secrets into property in order to provide an equitable remedy,
avoid the need for privity, and to prevent a contract conveying trade secrets from being classified
as an unlawful restraint on trade); Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of Trade Secrets in
Anglo-American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 313, 316-18 (1997) (discussing
how many have supported the view that trade secrets are an in rem right); Lemley, supra note
34, at 324-26 (discussing how trade secrets are both similar to and different from other
"property").
37. Lemley, supra note 34, at 320; see also 1 MELVIN F, JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1:3
(West 2010) ("Since the beginning, the focus of U.S. trade secret cases has been on penalizing a
breach of confidence and trust by the trade secret misappropriator.").
38. See, e.g., Thornton Robison, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law About Trade
Secrets, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 347, 389 (1983) (arguing that the difficulty in balancing the competing
interests in innovation and industrial mortality has "led firms with trade secrets to seek
protection through restrictive covenants and a tort of misappropriation").
39. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 36, at 243 (noting how "there is no such thing as a normative
autonomous body of trade secret law"); Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual
Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 69, 69, 93-116 (1999) (noting the existence of a "normative gap" in trade secret law, but
disagreeing with Bone and attempting to fill it using a variety of policy-based justifications);
David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret
Law, 5. J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 61-62 (1991) (observing how "there is in a sense no law of trade
secrets" but nonetheless attempting to justify the common law approach to trade secrets in
economic terms); Lemley, supra note 34, at 312 ("Courts and scholars have struggled for over a
century to figure out why we protect trade secrets.").
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inability to discern a coherent theory for the area necessitates
abandoning it in favor of individual common law doctrines. 40
While trade secrets originated as a state common law doctrine,
in 1979 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws drafted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), recognizing
the need to "clarify" and "harmonize" the laws of different states.41 An
overwhelming majority of states have since adopted the UTSA. 42 Yet,
the legislation seems to have done little to curtail common law
development in the area, both under and independent of the statute. 43
The statutory provisions tend to form no more than a starting point
for courts' analysis, which then proceeds in traditional common law
fashion. This greater than usual willingness to adopt a common law
approach within the statutory framework may, in turn, derive from
the reality that the statute itself sought to do no more than codify
rules that were essentially judge-made.
B. Publicity Rights: From Privacy to Property
Publicity rights originated as a branch of the common law of
torts and over time gradually evolved into full-blown property rights.
Publicity rights create an ownership interest in a set of characteristics
evoking the recognition of a natural person when used.44 As one
commentator put it, these rights protect "the inherent right of every
human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity."45 A
cause of action for a right of publicity infringement requires a showing
that: (1) the plaintiff owns an enforceable right in the identity or
40. See Bone, supra note 36, at 302-04. For a critical evaluation of Bone's position, see
Lemley, supra note 34, at 328-29.
41. Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: The States'
Response, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 49, 49-50 (1990).
42. As of March 2010, forty-six states had enacted the UTSA into law. 1 JAGER, supra note
37, § 3:29.
43. What is perhaps most interesting is that some states adopting the UTSA sought to
preempt all common law claims for trade secret misappropriation that predated their adoption of
the UTSA, while other legislatures only preempted common law doctrine that was in "conflict"
with the UTSA. In these latter states, independent common-law-based causes of action for
misappropriation of trade secrets continue to coexist with the statutory causes of action. See K.C.
Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Tech. & Operations, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 939, 955-56 (2009)
(noting this distinction and applying it to the California statute); see also Powell Prods., Inc. v.
Marks, 948 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (D. Colo. 1996) (discussing the Colorado statute); Micro Display
Sys., Inc. v. Axtel, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 202, 204 (D. Minn. 1988) (discussing the Minnesota statute);
Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 788-90 (Wis. 2006) (discussing the
Wisconsin statute).
44. Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the
Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1328 (2002).
45. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 23, § 1:3.
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persona of a natural person; (2) the defendant, without consent, used
some aspect of identity or persona such that plaintiff is identifiable
from the use; and (3) such use is likely to injure the commercial value
of the plaintiffs identity.46
Publicity rights originated as a branch of tort law dealing with
personal privacy. 47 Early decisions relied on a theory of implied
contract between plaintiff and defendant.48 Thereafter, the theory
developed into a tort-based one, focusing on the nature of the
defendant's use-whether the defendant had used the plaintiffs name
or likeness for "some advantage." 49 In this formulation, courts viewed
publicity rights as largely nonproprietary and thus incapable of being
assigned or alienated like other property rights.50 By the mid-
twentieth century, with the tortious element limited to commercial
situations, courts began to treat plaintiffs' interests as full-blown
property rights. This conception reached its culmination in Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,5 1 where the court
recognized the plaintiffs "right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture"52 and understood it to be fully transferable
without restrictions.53
46. 1 id. § 3:2.
47. These rights are ordinarily traced back to the famous 1890 law review article by Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 193-95 (1890) (tracing the development of privacy rights); see also Melville B.
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203-04 (1954) (attributing the
doctrine to Warren and Brandeis's article). But see William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV.
383, 401 (1960) (arguing that Warren and Brandeis did not direct attention to publicity rights in
their discussion of privacy). For the earliest case recognizing a common-law-based publicity right
and tracing it to the right of privacy, see Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68,
74-76 (Ga. 1905) (recognizing that the publication of a picture of a person, without his consent,
for a commercial purpose constituted a violation of the right of privacy).
48. See, e.g., Holmes v. Underwood & Underwood, 225 A.D. 360, 361-62 (N.Y. App. Div.
1929) (finding an implied contract existed between a photographer and his client); Klug v.
Sheriffs, 109 N.W. 656, 657-58 (Wis. 1906) (finding an implied contract existed between a
painter and a client and that it was a breach of faith for the painter to fashion a painting of the
client's deceased wife from retained photos); Pollard v. Photographing Co., (1888) 40 Ch.D. 345 at
346-50 (Eng.) (holding that the bargain between a customer and the photographer includes, by
implication, an agreement that the prints are solely for the customer's use); Prosser, supra note
47, at 401.
49. Prosser, supra note 47, at 403.
50. See Nimmer, supra note 47, at 209-10 ("In most jurisdictions it is well established that a
right of privacy is a personal right rather than a property right and consequently is not
assignable.").
51. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
52. Id. at 868.
53. For complimentary reviews of the decision, see Nimmer, supra note 47, at 221-23;
Prosser, supra note 47, at 406-07.
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In the decades that followed, many states recognized the cause
of action by statute. As part of that process, they made the right fully
alienable, and in some instances even descendible. 54 Again, much like
trade secret law, the state level codification seems to have done little
to impede courts' incremental development of the area.55
C. Idea Protection: Implied-in-Fact Contract
Idea protection law relies entirely on the common law doctrine
of implied-in-fact contracts to generate a principal of liability. Ideas
are expressly excluded from the coverage of copyright and patent
law. 56 Yet, occasionally the creator of an idea shares it with others, but
at the same time seeks to ensure that it isn't commercially exploited
against his or her wishes. In situations such as these, the common law
affords idea-creators tailored protection against bad-faith free riding.67
The principal common law protection for ideas rests on a theory
of implied-in-fact contract. The law implies the existence of an actual
agreement between parties based on their conduct and context.58 Even
in the absence of an express contractual understanding, state common
law allows idea-creators to prevent recipients from using it for free in
situations where: (1) the creator conditions the release of the idea
54. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 44, at 1324.
55. See, e.g., Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 2000)
(interpreting a Kentucky statute and extending it to cover action figures); Elvis Presley Enters.
v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 191-96 (5th Cir. 1998) (interpreting a Texas statute and extending it to
restaurant d6cor); see also Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 44, at 1324-25 n.11 (reviewing
expansions of the law that have benefited celebrities); Jennifer Rothman, Copyright Preemption
and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 206-07 n.19 (2002) (detailing some of the
more problematic expansions).
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2008) (excluding ideas from the coverage of copyright law).
Patent law similarly excludes protection for "abstract ideas." See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM
ON PATENTS § 1.03[2] (2010) (describing the exclusion of principles and abstract ideas).
57. The earliest systematic treatment of the subject dates back to the 1950s. See, e.g.,
Harold C. Havighurst, The Right to Compensation for an Idea, 49 Nw. U. L. REV. 295 (1954);
Benjamin Kaplan, Further Remarks on Compensation for Ideas in California, 46 CAL. L. REV.
699 (1958); Melville B. Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (1954); Harry R.
Olsson, Jr., Dreams for Sale: Some Observations on the Law of Idea Submissions and Problems
Arising Therefrom, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 34 (1958); Joseph D. Pannone, Property Rights in
an Idea and the Requirement of Concreteness, 33 B.U. L. REV. 396 (1953).
58. For an analysis of various other theories that are today preempted by federal copyright
law, see 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19D.02 (2010)
(discussing various legal theories to protect ideas); Lionel S. Sobel, The Law of Ideas, Revisited, 1
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 9, 32 (1994) (describing available state law protection). Implied contracts are
to be distinguished from the category of quasi-contract, where the law does not imply an actual
agreement, but rather imposes a set of obligations on parties that are contract-like, but originate
in the law, much like tortious principles. See Detroit Tigers, Inc. v. Ignite Sports Media, LLC,
203 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798-99 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (elaborating on this distinction in the context of
Illinois law); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra § 19D.02[B] (discussing "implied-in-law" contracts).
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upon an obligation to pay for its use; and (2) the recipient knows and
accepts the condition prior to obtaining the idea.59 Even when the
condition is not made explicit, courts have been willing to imply its
existence from the circumstances of the parties' relationship.60
Once these requirements are met, courts then move to
examining the idea's eligibility for protection. 61 Here, the law requires
a plaintiff to show that the idea was "concrete," which means either
that the idea must be ready for immediate use or that it must be
specific enough to be identifiable.62 The plaintiff must also show that
it was "novel," which requires merely that it was not already known in
the industry.63
59. See Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987) (denoting the elements
in the context of California law); Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 128 Cal. App. 3d 628, 646
(1982) (describing the same analytical framework); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, §
19D.05[A] [2] [a] [i] (stating these two circumstances as vital at the time an idea is disclosed).
60. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir.
1986) ("[T]he contract claim turns ... upon the implied promise to pay the reasonable value of
the material disclosed."); Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 756 (1956) ("[T]he positions occupied
by the parties should be sufficient to raise the inference that if the literary work is used by the
prospective buyer, compensation would be paid."); Gunther-Wahl Prods., Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 104
Cal. App. 4th 27, 43 (2002) (noting that the assertion of no liability without an express
agreement was contrary to California law and that the contested instruction improperly
permitted the argument); Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 2d 593, 607
(1966) (finding a promise to pay if the idea was used); Chandler v. Roach, 156 Cal. App. 2d 435,
441-42 (1957) ("There is nothing unreasonable in the assumption that a producer would obligate
himself to pay for the disclosure of an idea which he would otherwise be legally free to use, but
which in fact, he would be unable to use but for the disclosure.").
61. For a critical overview of these requirements, see Arthur R. Miller, Common Law
Protections for Products of the Mind: An "Idea" Whose Time Has Yet to Come, 119 HARV. L. REV.
703 718-32 (2006) (examining why courts adhere to the requirements despite unrelenting
criticism and finding that concreteness and novelty do not "strike the right balance between
encouraging market competition and rewarding mental creativity, and avoiding administrative
and evidentiary difficulties"); see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 19D.06 (discussing
the requirements and whether they should be necessary); Sobel, supra note 58, at 53-63
(discussing the requirements and taking issue with the conception of novelty in the Nimmer
treatise).
62. See Miller, supra note 61, at 723-26 (discussing the standard and courts' application of
the same); see also Sellers v. Am. Broad. Co., 668 F.2d 1207, 1210 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating the
essentiality of definiteness and completeness); Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 708
(D.C. Cir. 1953) (discussing the requirement and explaining that the law doesn't offer "protection
to vagueness"); Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (stating the
necessity of completeness); Jones v. Ulrich, 95 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950) (noting that
"the idea to be protected must be concrete to a degree"); Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663,
665 (Nev. 1975) (stating the need for concreteness at an idea's developmental stage).
63. See AEB & Assoc. Design Grp., Inc. v. Tonka Corp., 853 F. Supp. 724, 734 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) ("[A] plaintiff may not claim that an idea is original if it was already in use in the industry
at the time of the submission.") (citing McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 286 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)); Paul v. Haley, 588 N.Y.S.2d 897, 902-03 (App. Div. 1992) (noting that an idea merits
protection if it shows innovation and goes beyond existing knowledge); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 58, § 19D.06[B][1] ("[N]ovel ideas are those that are new, in the sense that they are
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Before federal copyright law preempted much of the area in
1976, idea protection under state law was far more extensive than
what it is today. Despite this federal preemption, state common law
continues to protect ideas through a cause of action that is largely
relational.
D. Misappropriation: Quasi Property
The doctrine of misappropriation, another product of common
law evolution, protects factual information ordinarily ineligible for
protection under copyright and patent law. Misappropriation
originated in the Supreme Court's decision in International News
Services v. Associated Press.64 The case involved one news
conglomerate lifting the new reports of a competitor from publicly
available newspapers and bulletin boards, and using them in its own
print newspapers. Conceding that the subject matter (news) was
outside the coverage of copyright law, the plaintiff argued that equity
and the impropriety of "reaping without sowing" necessitated
recognizing a property right in news, vested in its collector.65 To its
credit, the Court recognized both the need to prevent one business
from free riding on the efforts of another and the problems inherent in
granting a collector of valuable information unbounded property-like
in rem control over it. Balancing the two, it formulated the category of
"quasi property" that recognized the valuable nature of the time-
sensitive factual information exclusively between two competitors
"irrespective of the rights of either as against the public."66 Within a
limited setting, the right mimics the effects of in rem protection, using
the framework of unjust enrichment-hence "quasi" property.67
Because of both the demise of federal general common law in the years
not already being used in the industry for which they are proposed."); Miller, supra note 61, at
726-27 ("[C]ourts generally require the plaintiffs idea to reflect a spark of inventiveness or a
measurable quantity of creative genius beyond what was generally known in the trade.").
64. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). For more on the decision and its background, see generally Douglas
G. Baird, The Story of INS v. AP: Property, Natural Monopoly, and the Uneasy Legacy of a
Concocted Controversy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 9 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (discussing AP's strategic promotion of the idea of news as property,
the relationship between INS and AP, and the reception of the case in the lower courts); Baird,
supra note 2 (examining the misappropriation doctrine and its origin in the decision).
65. See Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 239-40.
66. Id. at 219.
67. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, "Hot News": The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing the unjust enrichment origins of the
misappropriation doctrine and its relationship with traditional conceptions of property).
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following the decision,68 and the federal preemption of copyright-like
causes, 69 litigants have invoked this doctrine with less frequency. 70 All
the same, the doctrine continues to subsist in several states.
More recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated that factual
information of the nature protected in International News might
sometimes merit protection under a theory of unfair competition.71
Accordingly, state common law courts have reconstructed the
misappropriation doctrine to overcome federal copyright preemption,
limiting protection to circumstances where no protection is available-
all on an amorphous theory of unfair competition. 72 The most
prominent of these reconstructions is the "hot news doctrine," which
allows recovery when: (1) the plaintiff gathers information at a cost;
(2) the information is time-sensitive; (3) the defendant free-rides on
such information; (4) the defendant is competing directly with the
plaintiff; and (5) such free riding would reduce the incentive to
produce the product or service, substantially threatening its existence
or quality.73 A principal limiting feature of the doctrine in this
construction is the existence of "direct competition" between the
plaintiff and the defendant. While courts have interpreted the
68. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal general
common law.").
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2008) ("[N]o person is entitled to any such right or equivalent
right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.").
70. Cf. Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of
Misappropriation and Other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 402 (1997) ("Since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, with its
broad preemption provisions, most had regarded misappropriation as a theory of liability that
had lost its vitality.").
71. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991) (quoting 1 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 58, § 3.04).
72. See, e.g., Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 711 (2d Cir.
1982) (affirming the finding of irreparable harm with respect to the misappropriation claim on
the basis of such a theory); Roy Exp. Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liech. v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1106 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Application of state unfair competition laws to
unpublished works protected by common-law copyright is preserved from preemption."); Bd. of
Trade of Chi. v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84, 93 (Ill. 1983) (explaining misappropriation as
"a combination of unjust enrichment and competitive injury"); U.S. Sporting Prods., Inc. v.
Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex. App. 1993) (describing
misappropriation's theoretical basis in unfair competition and declaring that the "tort of
misappropriation takes root in federal common law"); Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Econ.
Consultants, Inc., 218 N.W.2d 705, 715-16 (Wis. 1974) (setting forth unfair competition as a
flexible doctrine and asserting its "affirmative duty to protect rights that have arisen in the
course of the centuries of the evolution of the common law").
73. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997).
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requirement with varying degrees of stringency, 74 at a minimum the
doctrine does not extend to noncommercial or private appropriations
(unlike copyright law), thereby reducing the social costs of protection.
Of the different common law intellectual property regimes in
existence, misappropriation is perhaps the most open-ended, and is
often used as a catch-all, residual category. It is precisely for this
reason that historically, courts have made concerted efforts to limit its
application.75 It nonetheless remains viable.
E. Common Law Copyright: Literary Property
Common law copyright is the oldest of all common law
intellectual property regimes, having been in existence since the very
origins of copyright law.7 6 Despite controversies over its existence in
England and later under federal law,77 common law copyright
survived federal preemption and remains a viable basis for protection
under state law.78
To qualify for protection under common law copyright,
expression needs to be beyond the purview of federal copyright law's
coverage. It thus usually extends to two categories of works: (1)
subject matter that does not qualify as a "work of authorship" under
the copyright statute; 79 and (2) works that are not "fixed" in a tangible
medium of expression, as mandated by federal law.80 Sound recordings
74. See, e.g., U.S. Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1037-40
(3d Cir. 1984) (denying a claim because competition was indirect); Bd. of Trade of Chi., 456
N.E.2d at 89-90 (allowing a claim despite the absence of direct competition).
75. Judge Learned Hand, when on the Second Circuit, was well-known for his skepticism of
the doctrine, attempting to cabin its application on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Millinery
Creators' Guild, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 1940) ("[Tihe public
interest is best served by limiting the protection afforded an idea to the particular chattel in
which it is embodied."); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) ("[I]n
the absence of some recognized right at common law, or under the statutes . . . a man's property
is limited to the chattels which embody his invention.").
76. See supra note 4 (discussing the origins of common law copyright in England).
77. For a succinct discussion of the debate in England at the time, see Ronan Deazley, The
Myth of Copyright at Common Law, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 106, 132-33 (2003) (describing the
historical context of the modern law of copyright and focusing on "the common good as the
organizing principle . . . of copyright regulation"). For an exhaustive discussion of the debate
under federal U.S. law, see Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1186 (1983)
(tracing the evolution of the debate from the pre-Constitutional era forward and finding that
"assertions of the existence of common law copyright as a historical fact are in error").
78. Common law copyright was the primary target of the copyright statute's preemption
provision. Yet, the way in which the provision came to be drafted allowed common law copyright
to thrive unimpeded, in pockets. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1110-23.
79. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 2.02.
80. Id.
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fixed before 1972 are an example of the former,81 while
extemporaneous speeches, 82  unrecorded choreography, and
improvisational performanceS83 (for example, jazz performanceS84) are
examples of the latter. Protection under common law copyright
usually subsists only as long as the work remains unpublished. Once
published, a work loses common law protection regardless of its
eligibility for protection under federal copyright law. 85
Once covered by common law copyright, expression is protected
by a set of rights roughly analogous to those of federal copyright law.8 6
However, common law copyright remains more expansive than
statutory copyright in two important respects. First, unlike federal
copyright law, it subsists into perpetuity without a defined temporal
limit. Second, it isn't subject to the same kinds of exceptions and
limitations that exist under federal copyright law.87
Whether common law copyright contains a fair use limitation
was, until recently, largely a matter of speculation.88 While some
courts had hinted at its existence in dicta, none had officially endorsed
it, even though scholars had argued for such limits.8 9 In a recent
decision, a New York state court expressly acknowledged that a fair
use doctrine was part of the state's common law copyright regime. The
decision gleaned from federal law and noted how fair use actually
81. This is a consequence of section 301(c), which explicitly provides that common law
copyright for sound recordings fixed before 1972 is to subsist until the year 2067. 17 U.S.C. §
301(c) (2008); see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 263 (N.Y.
2005) (finding pre-1972 sound recordings to be protected by New York's common law copyright
regime).
82. See Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 740-41 (1969) (finding that speeches
delivered orally can be the subject of state copyright); cf. Falwell v. Penthouse Int'l, 521 F. Supp.
1204, 1208 (W.D. Va. 1981) (denying protection for an extemporaneous interview in the absence
of clear segregation); Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255-57 (N.Y.
1968) (rejecting common law copyright protection for conversations when they had not been
clearly demarcated).
83. See generally Gregory S. Donat, Note, Fixing Fixation: A Copyright with Teeth for
Improvisational Performers, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1375-77 (1997) (noting the problems with
common law copyright protection for improvisational performances).
84. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 8C.02
85. 1 id. § 2.02.
86. 2 id. § 8C.02.
87. Most of which have, in the statutory context, come to be codified. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-
112 (2008).
88. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 8C.02 (discussing support for the proposition
"that fair use forms part of common law copyright doctrine, properly construed").
89. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 267 (N.Y. 2005)
(discussing the federal doctrine and finding "no justification for adopting a different rule of state
law"); Hemingway's Estate v. Random House, Inc., 279 N.Y.S.2d 51, 57 (Sup. Ct. 1967)
(discussing the doctrine's justification).
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furthers the regime's goals-illustrative of the common law process
through which the regime continues to develop. 90
II. PRAGMATIC INCREMENTALISM AND COMMON LAW
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Today, there is no dearth of theories attempting to explain the
common law method of lawmaking. They range from those that view
the common law as attempting to maximize one or more basic values
(for example, efficiency or corrective justice) to those that believe in
the common law being entirely the product of individual, context-
based adjudication.9 ' Pragmatic incrementalism belongs to the latter
category and draws from the overlapping ideas of common law
incrementalism, decisional minimalism, and legal pragmatism.
Richard Posner, the most ardent defender of legal pragmatism
today, associates the school with three "essential" elements.92 The first
is "antifoundationalism"-a distrust of metaphysical explanations or
grand theories that seek to determine the content of the law by
90. EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp., No. 601209-08, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7485,
at *41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 2008) (denying preliminary injunction).
91. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 3 (1991)
(explaining that the common law "consists of the rules that would be generated at the present
moment by application of the institutional principles that govern common law adjudication");
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (1972) (surveying the common law fields
and concluding that "the common law exhibits a deep unity that is economic in character");
POUND, supra note 25, at 183 (explaining the basis for the common law and emphasizing that
such law "is to be discovered by judicial and juristic experience of the rules and principles which
in the past have accomplished or have failed to accomplish justice"); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 223-27 (1995) (describing the exercise of judgment and the determinacy or
corrective justice); Holmes, supra note 25, at 461 (viewing the law as "prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact"); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977) (arguing the pervasiveness of "the tendency of the set of all
legal rules to become dominated by rules achieving efficient . . . allocative effects"); Richard A.
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488 (1980) ("[W]ealth maximization, especially in the common law setting,
derives support from the principle of consent that can also be regarded as underlying the
otherwise quite different approach of Pareto ethics."); Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the
Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 620
(Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds., 2002) (emphasizing "the conventional foundations of law"
and exploring "a practiced discipline of public practical reasoning" as a vital and "defining
feature of law"); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51
(1977) ("[T]he efficient rule situation noted by Posner is due to an evolutionary mechanism
whose direction proceeds from the utility maximizing decisions of disputants rather than from
the wisdom of judges.").
92. Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1660
(1990).
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reference to one or more core values. 93 The second is the belief that
legal rules are best valued by their actual consequences, both short-
and long-term. 94 Unlike schools of legal thought that advocate
adhering to coherent rules independent of their impact, pragmatism
remains heavily "instrumental."95 The third is legal pragmatism's
insistence that decisionmaking be contextualized, rather than
abstracted or rendered "objective."96 Contextualization refers to the
belief that all thinking remains deeply embedded in social practice
and that attempts to disaggregate the two are futile. In a sense, this
idea builds on the antifoundationalism that is central to legal
pragmatism. 97
Antifoundationalism, instrumentalism, and contextualization
thus form the central tenets of legal pragmatism. These principles,
however, focus not just on the substantive content of the law, but also
on the lawmaking process itself. In other words, they also provide us
with a reason why pragmatic decisionmaking in the common law
remains characterized by an incremental (or gradual) process of rule
development.
Incrementalism refers to a characteristic of lawmaking that
favors narrow, circumstantially-tailored decisions-a feature that its
protagonists often describe as decisional "narrowness."98 From a
normative standpoint, decisional "narrowness" can come about for a
variety of reasons. It can arise when courts intentionally avoid
addressing politically divisive issues thereby facilitating democratic
deliberation, as commonly seen in the constitutional context. 99 This is
often referred to as minimalism in the context of constitutional
93. For early uses of this term in the context of philosophical pragmatism, see ANTI-
FOUNDATIONALISM AND PRACTICAL REASONING: CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN HERMENEUTICS AND
ANALYSIS (E. Simpson ed., 1987); Posner, supra note 92, at 1659.
94. See Posner, supra note 92, at 1657 (describing this feature as the "forward-looking"
attribute of pragmatism).
95. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 95 (1986) (castigating pragmatism for failing to
respect the past for its "own sake").
96. Posner, supra note 92, at 1660-61.
97. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 799 (1989)
("The pragmatists' first thesis-that knowledge is essentially contextual, situated in habit and
practice-holds that no such zero-based method of inquiry is possible.").
98. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
10 (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE]; Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 353, 362-64 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Minimalism].
99. For an elaboration of the virtues of this process, see SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE, supra note
98, at 3 (describing this process as that of "[1]eaving things undecided"); Cass R. Sunstein,
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1733, 1752-53 (1995) (arguing that
because judges lack a "democratic pedigree" they should avoid deciding cases based on "large
theories" that cut against the democratic process).
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adjudication. Alternatively, it can come about because of a strong
belief in the value of precedent-in the virtues of deviating from the
past minimally in order to preserve an old tradition.100 It can also,
however, come about because of pragmatic reasons, connecting it to
the central ideas of legal pragmatism.
Recall that legal pragmatism places great emphasis on
instrumental and contextual rulemaking. Translated to the
adjudicatory process, this implies that the same emphasis ought to
guide judges' decisionmaking as well.10 1 Thus, any rule or decision
ought to be driven by its consequences in society, measured by
concrete (as opposed to abstract) attributes. Assessing the
consequences of a decision or rule requires an empirical prediction,
and the further removed the rule becomes from the case at hand, the
greater the predictive uncertainty associated with its future
consequences. 1 0 2 Given pragmatism's emphasis on the consequences of
a decision, it tends to caution against broad rulings with uncertain
consequences.
Decisional narrowness derives from pragmatism's insistence
that consequences inform decisions. 103 In the face of uncertainty over
future consequences, it advocates a sense of caution. This corresponds
to what some scholars describe as the "implicit behavioral rationality"
of the common law-the common law's recognition that actors
(including judges) are boundedly rational agents, and its consequent
deployment of corrective mechanisms and devices to compensate for
this boundedness.1 04 Since judges cannot predict the consequences of
their rulings for all time, they adopt narrow rulings where
100. See Holmes supra note 25, at 469 (noting the irrationality of such an approach and
observing famously that "[ilt is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV").
101. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5 (1996)
(describing how pragmatic judges make decisions prioritizing present and future needs).
102. For a recognition of this point, see RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 246-47
(2008) (observing how pragmatic judges are likely to favor narrow rather than broad rulings, in
the early evolution of a legal doctrine).
103. See id. at 246 (explaining how economic cost-benefit analysis fairly describes how judges
weigh consequences).
104. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
235 (2006); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 574 (1998) (describing steps courts take to correct for the
human propensity to view past events with a hindsight bias); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior
and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 215-17 (2001) (citing the workplace as an area in which
the common law can help correct for inefficient and unfair behavioral incentives, such as
employers discharging late-career employees earlier than they implicitly contracted).
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consequences are easier to predict based on information available to
them.105
Legal pragmatism's insistence on contextualizing rule- and
decisionmaking also favors narrow rulings. In the abstract,
instrumentalism and contextualization may seem to conflict.106
Contextualization emphasizes the centrality of custom and social
practices, as well as socially situated rulemaking. 07 In the common
law, any rule originates not from a pre-commitment to a set of values,
but rather from the facts of the case at hand. Justice Holmes, the
quintessential common law pragmatist, thus observed that it was "the
merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines
the principle afterwards." 0 8 Focusing on the case at hand results in
narrow rulings. On the whole, common law pragmatism thus favors an
incremental approach to rulemaking.
To sum up, pragmatic incrementalism builds on the values of
instrumentalism, antifoundationalism, and contextualization that it
draws from legal pragmatism. As a theory of common law
decisionmaking, it also favors decisional narrowness or
incrementalism. These values in turn translate into four characteristic
practical attributes when applied to common law decisionmaking,
which the next Section elaborates on, in the process identifying
strategies and techniques that courts use to instantiate them in the
context of common law intellectual property.
To be sure, sometimes common law courts do deviate from
several of these techniques and ideas. Nevertheless, they are central
to common law intellectual property decisionmaking. Courts act
cautiously, construct their rules and principles in value-neutral terms,
customize law and lawmaking, and strive to balance ex ante and ex
post considerations. The rest of this Part examines these four
principles in detail.
105. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE, supra note 98, at 53 (arguing that minimalism is a sensible
reaction to judges' inability to predict all consequences).
106. For a description of this point, see Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 24 (1996) (explaining that instrumentalism and contextualization developed
as independent, often opposing schools of thought).
107. See Grey, supra note 97, at 798-800 (discussing how pragmatists believe that
knowledge derives from habit and practice, highly rooted in the social context). For strands of
this idea in philosophical pragmatism, see CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, What Pragmatism Is, in 5
COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE para. 416 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss
eds., 1934).




A. Caution in the Face of Uncertainty
The first practical attribute of pragmatic incrementalism is
courts' concern with errors. In dealing with an activity that is prone to
change, courts often try to cabin the scope of their decisions, thereby
enhancing the law's ability to address future developments with fewer
constraints when needed. Some term this as the concern with "error
costs"-the concern that either a high number of small mistakes or a
small number of large mistakes will seriously harm the legal system
and society. 09 This concern with mistakes that are likely to flow from
the inadequacy of information about a law's consequences results in
courts exercising a good degree of caution in their development of the
law.
Caution of this nature is particularly common in situations
where the consequences of a rule remain uncertain. Again, this
derives from pragmatism's insistence that decision- and rulemaking
pay close attention to their context and consequences. 110 Caution may
be seen during the early stages of a rule's development, when its
impact remains altogether unknown. 1 ' Sometimes, however, it may
also bear no connection to the stage of doctrinal development in an
area. This is seen most prominently in areas that remain inherently
susceptible to change, due either to technological developments or
other sociocultural factors. Cass Sunstein, for instance, argues that
the Supreme Court's opinions dealing with the application of the First
Amendment to new communications technologies are characterized by
a significant amount of caution.112
Another good example of the common law's emphasis on
caution is stare decisis's useful differentiation between the holding
and dicta of a case.113 The traditional principle emphasizes that it is
only a court's holding in a case that binds a future court, with a
holding understood as the court's application of the rule it formulates
109. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE, supra note 98, at 49-50 (describing "error costs" as the costs
of mistaken judgments, and arguing that a minimalist approach is sometimes the best way to
minimize them); see also Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions,
110 ETHICS 5, 26 (1999) (discussing the potential societal harm that can arise when broad
decisions are made by judges who cannot predict every conceivable consequence).
110. See infra text accompanying notes 194-208.
111. See POSNER, supra note 102, at 246 (describing how pragmatic judges may favor narrow
decisionmaking early in a legal doctrine's development, so as not to step beyond the level of
consequential information the case provides).
112. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE, supra note 98, at 181.
113. See generally Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV.
953, 956-58, 1065 (2005) (describing the distinction in some detail and the lack of scholarly
attention to it).
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to the facts of the dispute before it. Extensions or variations of the rule
that the court doesn't itself apply to the case are loosely classified as
dicta and not binding on future courts.114 To be sure, the distinction is
not watertight, and courts certainly never adhere to it with any
rigidity. Yet, it originated in the common law's desire to force courts to
limit their formulations to the case at hand, leaving later courts free
to modify earlier precedents as circumstances demand.
In developing common law intellectual property, courts have
long proceeded cautiously for two reasons. First is the uncertainty
accompanying the area of information production. Common law courts
lack expertise on the nuances of the industry under consideration,
especially when it involves new technologies and when future
developments remain unclear.115 Second is the uncertainty about the
costs and benefits of free riding. It might be beneficial to allow some
free riding under limited circumstances, and broad property-like
exclusionary regimes may have a chilling effect on certain kinds of
socially beneficial activities.116
A cautious approach leaves open the possibility that an
exclusionary regime may prove to be unnecessary as an industry
develops, or that strong public interest concerns may outweigh the
need for protection.'17 It also allows courts to take the law in new
directions, should technology or other socioeconomic realities change
dramatically. Recall that one of the issues with all forms of
intellectual property protection is that it impacts not just outputs, but
also inputs. Outputs protected under an exclusionary regime form
114. For an early elaboration on this distinction by Chief Justice Marshall, see Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821); see also Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article H1I,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994) (referring to dicta as "statements in a judicial opinion that
are not necessary to support the decision reached by the court").
115. For an analysis of the interaction between industry structure and legal entitlements,
see Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 123,
124-26 (2006) (arguing that intellectual property assignments that affect product development
decisionmaking can have a major influence on future economic performance).
116. Indeed, this was the basis of Judge Learned Hand's and Justice Brandeis's objections to
common law intellectual property creation to begin with. See supra text accompanying note 6.
117. A case in point is the television industry in the United States, where broadcasters were
long denied full-blown property protection over their content-carrying transmission signals
(unlike in Europe, which recognized such protection). It resulted in the emergence of a robust
cable television industry, and the idea of "free television" as an operational paradigm in the
United States. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Social Costs of Property Rights in
Broadcast (and Cable) Signals, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1303, 1305-06 (2007) (discussing the
difference between countries recognizing "broadcasters' rights" and the United States); Timothy
Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 319-24 (2004) (discussing the
patchwork system of intellectual property protection regulating the cable industry in favor of
broadcasters, and noting that the cable industry experienced major growth once regulation was
relaxed in the mid 1970's).
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inputs into future production, often of the same kind that the regime
is seeking to encourage.118 The magnitude and precise nature of this
dynamic inefficiency is impossible to predict, and a cautious approach
leaves courts free to drastically reduce their impact on the system by
building the system up incrementally, eliminating such inefficiencies
when they arise. Were courts to adopt an expansive, context-neutral
approach to protecting common law intellectual property, they would
be forced to retrench the system later on by carving out limitations
and exceptions, thereby undermining any reliance placed on earlier
rules.
1. Relational Property
The first cautionary technique involves moving away from the
idea of property. Property rights ordinarily operate in rem, against the
world at large, by providing their holders with an entitlement to
exclude others from an identified resource. Such exclusion is necessary
to make optimal use of scarce physical resources. Intangibles and
informational resources, however, are by their very nature
nonrivalrous, and simultaneous uses of them do not interfere with
each other. A property right is therefore granted in them largely to
function as an incentive for their very production. While such
protection provides an incentive to produce, it also imposes costs on
society as a whole by forbidding others from using the resource. In
economic terms, these costs are often referred to as static and dynamic
inefficiencies.1 19 Tailoring the property right (that is, the incentive) by
limiting it balances these competing interests.
Most common law intellectual property regimes try to do just
this. Their conception of property is tailored to the peculiarities of the
relationship between a specific class of plaintiffs and defendants.120 In
other words, protection is not automatically available against the
world at large, like it is for ordinary property or indeed traditional
intellectual property.
118. See BENKLER, supra note 22, at 36-37 (describing how enforcing copyright protection
causes information to be underutilized in the present, but hopes to increase information
production over time).
119. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 12-13.
120. By "relationship," I do not mean to emphasize that there needs to be a pre-existing
relationship or connection between the parties, but rather that the triggering event for the
entitlement originates in the interaction between them, regardless of whether it predates the
cause of action or occurs simultaneously with it.
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Take, for example, the Court's decision in International News
Service.121 Conscious of the problems with recognizing full-blown
property protection for news (that is, information), the court
emphasized that the property-like interest it was creating was a
consequence of the competitive relationship between the two parties,
an interest it labeled "quasi property" for precisely this reason. 122
Independent of such competition, the interest would cease to exist;
competition is an element of the doctrine that state common law
continues to emphasize to this day. What was the court really worried
about in avoiding full-blown property protection for news? For one,
monopoly control over information (as opposed to original expression)
would have run up against free speech concerns by impeding the
dissemination of information to (and among) the public.123
Additionally, the majority opinion also limited itself to the newspaper
industry as it existed then, seemingly aware of the possibility that the
mechanisms of news transmission were likely to develop and change
over time.124
A similar emphasis on the relational nature of the entitlement
is seen in the law of trade secrets, where Justice Holmes famously
emphasized that the use of "property" to describe trade secrets should
not detract from the reality that it always arises within the context of
a specific relationship between two parties. 125 The same is true of
common law idea protection, where the protectable interest originates
entirely in the implied relationship between a plaintiff-creator and a
defendant. 126
121. See supra text accompanying notes 64-70. For an analysis of the case in terms of
restitutionary principles see Gordon, supra note 2, at 266-68 (arguing that fairness and
economics would be served by restoring INS to its restitutionary principles).
122. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
123. See id. at 241 (noting that the aim was not to allow monopolization over information-
gathering and dissemination, but rather to secure partial temporary exclusion to prevent one
competitor from reaping the fruits of another's efforts).
124. See id. (observing how the "practical needs and requirements of the [news] business"
were reflected in the complainant's bylaws). Recent scholarly work has suggested that the news
industry had been lobbying for property-like protection in the decades leading up to
International News Service, efforts which failed at the legislative level. See Robert Brauneis, The
Transformation of Originality in the Progressive-Era Debate over Copyright in News 2 (George
Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 403, 2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365366. Brauneis also argues that at the time, the industry relied
heavily on an informal system of information-exchange, which would change rapidly with the
advent of the telegraph. See id. at 11, 15.
125. See E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (noting
that the trade secret issue at hand originated in prior confidential relationship between the
parties, rather than from property or due process).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
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2. Discretionary Subject-Matter Filters
Not all forms of common law intellectual property emphasize
the relationship between plaintiff and defendant. Some continue to
operate as traditional in rem property interests. 127 Yet here too, courts
limit the scope of the right by reference to the peculiarities of the
informational resource at issue. Very often, such limits supplement
relational limits. Limiting by subject matter entails the use of filtering
devices to circumscribe the eligibility of an intangible for protection
independent of the defendant's own actions. Subject matter limits are
well known in statutory patent and copyright. Common law
intellectual property regimes have their own set devices, limiting
eligibility for protection by context.
These subject matter limits give common law courts great
flexibility. They afford common law courts broad discretion to mold
them to new contexts and to give effect to diverse values that justify
the grant or denial of protection. This discretion allows courts to limit
the reach of a regime through both substantive and structural
methods. The former involves interpreting the limit to exclude
something from protection, while the latter entails cabining or
limiting precedent narrowly to the facts in issue. To be sure, both
methods are also available to courts in the statutory intellectual
property context, but the presence of statutory language, often
defining or guiding the application of the limit, constrains courts'
ability to limit precedent.
The requirement of "concreteness" is a particularly good
example of a subject matter filter designed to foster judicial discretion.
Common law idea protection insists that an idea be "concrete" for it to
be eligible for protection.128 Yet, courts have struggled to make sense
of concreteness. The substantive method of employing the filter can
take two forms: one approach takes concreteness to mean that the
idea must be reduced to a tangible form, 129 presumably to serve an
127. Publicity rights and common law copyright are perhaps good examples.
128. See Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (noting that "the
law shies away from according protection to vagueness").
129. See, e.g., Shanco Int'l Ltd. V. Digital Controls, Inc., 312 S.E.2d 150, 153-54 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1983) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs wrongful appropriation claim in part because his
idea for a video game was not put in any concrete, usable form, such as plans, blueprints, or
diagrams); Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (Syracuse Mun. Ct. 1948)
(dismissing a breach of contract to pay for an advertising slogan claim for reasons including that
even if the defendant obtained the idea from the plaintiff, ideas that are not embodied in
concrete form are not protected absent express contract); Tutelman v. Stokowski, 44 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 47, 48 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1939) (dismissing plaintiffs claim that he had a property right in
his idea for producing animated cartoons to run synchronously with well-known musical
compositions in a motion picture for reasons including that an idea must be put into a concrete
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evidentiary role, while another interprets it to imply merely that the
idea be detailed and developed, in order to avoid the problem of
overbreadth. 130 Judicial opinions have gone back and forth-affirming
both theories for the doctrine. 131 Additionally, courts have used the
common law origins of the concreteness filter to limit extensions of the
law to new situations even when other courts haven't found the need
to through the common law process-the structural method of
employing the filter. Thus, while one court has denied protection to
the slogan "Neighborly Haberle" on the ground that it was not
concrete, another allowed protection for the slogan "A Macy Christmas
and A Happy New Year."132 The latter court distinguished the former
case by noting how the slogan there was a part of a "full and
complete," "carefully phrased" advertising plan, effectively limiting
the earlier holding to its unique facts. 133 In another case involving
cigarette advertisements, a court distinguished an earlier decision
that had extended protection to a similar idea by express reference to
the common law nature of the limit. It observed that each case had to
be limited to its own facts and that the concreteness limit was
"incapable of exact determination." 1 34 Scholars have criticized these
opinions for their seemingly inconsistent application of the standard
in near-identical scenarios. 135 Yet from a structural point of view, they
represent the effective use of the concreteness filter as a discretionary
form of expression, which entails incorporating it into a product, which then becomes property, in
order to be protected).
130. See, e.g., Jones v. Ulrich, 95 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950) (reversing the trial
court's dismissal while noting that "[allthough the idea to be protected must be concrete to a
degree, there appears no requirement that it must be tangible and in a material form to entitle it
to the protection of a court of equity"); Flemming v. Ronson Corp., 258 A.2d 153, 156 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1969) (finding that the plaintiffs idea for a type of artificial candle, though not yet
expressed in physical form, was still "concrete and usable," but dismissing the claim on other
grounds).
131. See Miller, supra note 61, at 726 n.94 (noting the "uncertainty over the philosophical
basis for the concreteness requirement," and how it has led to inconsistent case law).
132. Compare Bailey, 85 N.Y.S.2d at 54, with Healey v. R.H. Macy & Co., 297 N.Y.S. 165
(N.Y. App. Div. 1937) (per curiam) (reinstating jury verdict in favor of plaintiff), aff'd, 14 N.E.2d
388 (N.Y. 1938).
133. See Bailey, 85 N.Y.S.2d at 53 (distinguishing Healey on the grounds that in that case
"plaintiff submitted to defendant not merely a slogan, but a full and complete advertising plan in
writing, featuring the slogan, with drawings and sketches, and 200 words of carefully phrased
advertising material").
134. Compare Thomas v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 38 A.2d 61, 63-64 (Pa. 1944) (affirming
judgment for defendant tobacco company because plaintiffs idea was not novel and concrete,
noting that "[e]ach case of this nature must of necessity depend upon its own facts"), with Liggett
& Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 194 N.E. 206, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1935) (affirming on grounds
including that plaintiffs idea for a billboard cigarette advertisement was concrete enough to go
to a jury).
135. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 19D.06[A] [1]; Miller, supra note 61, at 726 n.94.
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limit on extending protection to a domain where the consequences of
such an extension remain unclear. The emphasis placed on the specific
facts of a case to assess the concreteness of an idea is perhaps
indicative of courts approaching the task of protecting ideas through a
cautious assessment of the likely consequences.
B. Semantic Value Pluralism
Another distinguishing feature of the common law method is
its use of concepts and terms that are couched at a relatively high
level of abstraction. Rather than committing themselves to a
particular set of values or goals for the law, this enables courts to look
at conflicting values and balance them through a form of practical
reasoning. 136 The conceptual apparatus of the common law thus
remains largely value neutral.137
Tort law is a strikingly good example of this. Tort theorist Leon
Green described this best when he noted that common law tort
concepts are "exceedingly flexible, capable of accommodating many
shades of meaning," representing "not a language of precision but
rather one of ambiguity ... always requiring the judgment of some
one [sic] to make it explicit."138 Common law concepts thus derive their
content from the way courts and litigants invoke them and instantiate
them with particular meaning, as necessitated by the context. 139 The
concepts are therefore, on their own, capable of accommodating
multiple values-in the process allowing them to coexist within the
broader parameters of the system. Value pluralism derives entirely
from legal pragmatism's antifoundational ideal.140
136. For a succinct discussion of why judges rely on practical reasoning, see Joseph William
Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 944-48 (2009).
137. See Mario J. Rizzo, Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law, 4 CATO J.
865, 865 (1985) ("The common law . . . can restrict itself to the provision of abstract rules that
enhance the possibilities of an order in which individuals can pursue and attain their own
goals."); cf. Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 300 (2007)
(observing that even when decisions are rendered using concepts that have deontic significance,
they allow for consequentialist explanations as a consequence of the specialized meaning they
have come to acquire over time-a process referred to as the "contextualist convergence").
138. Leon Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, Part II: Judicial Law Making, 64 W. VA. L. REV.
115, 129 (1962).
139. Coleman refers to this as the process of "inferential role semantics." JULES L. COLEMAN,
THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 7 (2001); see also Kraus, supra note 137, at 313-14 (explaining how
Coleman rejects the notion that semantic elements have a determinate meaning in favor of the
view that concepts are understood relationally).
140. For a discussion of legal pragmatism's antifoundational approach, see supra Part II.A.
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Though scholars have analyzed common law intellectual
property regimes in terms of foundational theories, the rules of the
regimes themselves continue to consciously disavow exclusive reliance
on any one theory. Much like the rest of the common law, they have
continued to develop in semantically neutral terms, enabling a
contextual balancing and application of foundational values. This is
far less true of statutory intellectual property.14 1 Common law
intellectual property's value pluralism occurs at two different levels.
Systemically, the regimes straddle multiple doctrinal areas including
tort, property, contract, and unjust enrichment. They draw devices
and ideas from each of them, to produce a hybrid regime that
resembles them all, but in parts. On a more granular level, they use
doctrinal concepts and devices that are inherently open to contestation
in terms of foundational value.
1. Interdoctrinalism
Common law intellectual property regimes resist categorization
into any single area of the common law. To begin with, they do not
treat the idea of property as an in rem right that is agnostic to the
context and circumstances where it is enforced.142 They also borrow
ideas and devices from tort, contract, and unjust enrichment to
produce a hybrid regime that emphasizes different aspects at different
times. Precisely what end does this serve though? First, it allows a
regime to integrate multiple goals and values into its functioning. For
instance, by relying on tort law ideas, which emphasize the
wrongfulness of a defendant's actions, it incorporates the ideal of
corrective justice into its framework.143 Similarly, by using party
consent as a device from contract law, it values autonomy. Second, as
a direct consequence of this integration, it allows each individual
141. Even if statutory regimes do use concepts and ideas that are value-neutral on their face,
they most often undergo a process of "contextualist convergence," where as a consequence of
courts' use of ideas and concepts with a certain meaning/purpose in mind, the concept itself
comes to acquire distinct meaning associated exclusively with the meaning/purpose in question.
See Kraus, supra note 137, at 349. Copyright's fair use doctrine is an excellent example of this
phenomenon, where courts have over the years come to understand the doctrine almost entirely
in market failure (or transaction cost related) terms. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, The End of
Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-line Commerce, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130-34 (1997).
142. For a discussion of how intellectual property's nonrivalrous nature necessitates a
relational property view, see supra Part II.A.1.
143. See Jules Coleman & Gabe Mendlow, The Normative Structure of Tort Law (forthcoming
2011), available at http://www.law.upenn.edulacademics/institutes/ilp/2009papers/Coleman
PennWorkshopDraft.pdf (arguing that the normative structure of tort law affirms the ideal of
corrective justice even if the institution's foundational ideals may be more diverse),
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regime to resist affirming the values associated with any single area of
the law. For instance, if a regime rested entirely on contract law,
courts would be hard-pressed to accommodate corrective justice and
other values to which contract law remains largely inattentive. 144
Scholars have long criticized courts for their eclectic approach
to rulemaking in the area of common law intellectual property. This is
perhaps most noticeable in the area of trade secrets, where the
inability to cabin the area into a single theory has even resulted in
some questioning its utility as an independent area of intellectual
property and recommending its replacement with individual common
law doctrines. 145 While a unified theory for trade secrets may enhance
its coherence and logical consistency, it is by no means clear that this
lack of coherence has proven to be a practical problem. 146
Trade secret law is perhaps the best example of
interdoctrinalism. It draws on devices from property, contract, tort,
and unjust enrichment. In the process, it endorses multiple values:
incentives, allocative efficiency, autonomy, commercial morality,
corrective justice, and other distributive goals. 147 Publicity rights also
reflect this feature, albeit to a lesser degree. While these rights are
today thought to be truly proprietary, given earlier understandings of
the area as deriving from tort and contract law, courts and scholars
continue to disagree about the area's underlying theoretical
justification. As a result, multiple theories, each with a very different
144. See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J.
763, 797 (1983) (exploring justifications for paternalism in contract law and criticizing it for
being inattentive to the unique motives of contracting individuals); Anthony T. Kronman,
Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 474 (1979) (arguing that contract law
should be used to promote distributive justice when alternative means are less acceptable).
145. See Bone, supra note 36, at 246-47 (arguing that trade secret law should not extend
beyond the limits of individual common law areas such as contracts or torts, describing it as "not
essential to the protection of intellectual property").
146. The focus of Bone's analysis remains almost entirely on problems with individual
"general" theories often proposed to justify the entire body of trade secret law. In practice, trade
secret law seems to be far less problematic, other than facing problems in justifying its own
existence on the basis of any single theory. Yet Bone's argument can be understood to make the
case more convincingly for an antifoundationalist approach to trade secret law-one that
recognizes the multiplicity and incompatibility of its numerous values. See id. at 304 (arguing
that we should "recognize trade secret law for what it is: a collection of contract and tort theories
grouped together by the nature of the subject matter they regulate").
147. See KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON
LAW 3-4 (1988) (underscoring concerns for democracy and efficiency); see also James W. Hill,
Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, and the Classification of Obligations, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 2
(1999) (noting that courts sometimes view liability under trade secret law as attempting to
"enforce morality in business"); Lemley, supra note 34, at 319-28 (explaining trade secret law
through tort, contract, property, and commercial morality).
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emphasis, coexist. 148 Prominent theories for the continued existence of
publicity rights include those focused on economic incentives, natural
rights, efficient allocation, and autonomy, and those seeking to
suppress commercial misrepresentation. 1 4 9 Again, much like trade
secret law, theoretical diversity flourishes because these rights
operate at the intersection of multiple doctrinal areas and draw from
them for concepts and ideas.
2. Contestability
Contestability is a philosophical idea that refers to a situation
of disagreement about the normative content of a particular
concept.150 While some understand contestability to be a feature of
vagueness, others attribute it to theoretical or ideological
disagreement. 15 1 Beyond mere contestability though, certain concepts
are thought to be "essentially contested" in nature, a term first coined
by the philosopher W.B. Gallie. 152 A concept is "essentially contested"
when contestability (or normative disagreement over its content) is
central to its meaning and existence. In other words, contestability is
a fundamental purpose of these concepts, rendering it essential to
their enterprise. 153 Examples include concepts such as art, democracy,
freedom, and sovereignty.
Where normative disagreement is central to an area or
recognized to be intractable, essentially contested concepts allow a
discourse to focus participants' attention on the contestation and its
basis. 15 4 Essential contestability thus emphasizes that the meanings of
some concepts need to change over time, as circumstances change, and
148. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 1:1-26; Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a
Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 406 (1999) (noting the unsettled nature of the
justification, legitimacy, scope, and content of the right of publicity).
149. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, §§ 2:1-2:9.
150. Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL.
L. REV. 509, 526 (1994).
151. See TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 47 (2000) (describing it as a form of
vagueness but noting disagreement over this characterization).
152. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SoC'Y 167, 171-72
(1956). For a more recent extension of the idea, see Christine Swanton, On the "Essential
Contestedness" ofPolitical Concepts, 95 ETHICS 811 (1985) (reformulating the concept of essential
contestedness).
153. Gallie, supra note 152, at 169 ("[C]oncepts the proper use of which inevitably involves
endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.").
154. Waldron, supra note 150, at 530-33.
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that predicting or prescribing this change in advance is likely to be
impossible.155
The connection between essential contestability and
antifoundationalism should be obvious. Essentially contested concepts
and ideas allow multiple values and normative goals to coexist under
a common head and for their conflict to remain central to the very
meaning of those concepts and ideas. One characteristic feature of the
common law lies in its persistent use of standards (as opposed to
rules) to frame its doctrinal content.156 Standards, as scholars have
long argued, give courts greater discretion to adapt the law to new
circumstances ex post, while offering actors just enough guidance to
plan their actions ex ante.15 7 Additionally, when framed in terms that
facilitate normative debate over their purpose and meaning, standards
resemble essentially contested concepts.' 58
Common law intellectual property regimes use several
prominent concepts that are contestable in this sense. Indeed, the
mere possibility of such contestability has encouraged courts to
employ loose standards rather than tightly worded rules in their rule
formulation. Consider, for example, trade secret law's requirement
that the plaintiff have taken "reasonable efforts" to preserve the
secrecy of the information in question. When exactly is a measure
"reasonable"?159 As expected, here we find a wide array of views,
ranging from those that examine the cost-effectiveness of a plaintiffs
actions, to those that emphasize the signaling effects of a plaintiffs
measures to protect secrecy.160 Although courts interpret this
155. Gallie, supra note 152, at 172 (prescribing a condition of essential contestability to be
that "[t]he accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of considerable modification in
light of changing circumstances; and such modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in
advance").
156. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1685-712 (1976) (addressing the challenge of deciding between rules and standards
as the forms for legal directives); cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 174-87
(1991) (describing the common law process in terms that correspond to its use of generalizable
rules-resembling the idea of standards).
157. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 568-
70 (1992) (describing the debate in terms of ex ante and ex post approaches to lawmaking).
158. For a recent argument similarly contrasting rules and standards, see Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214,
1214 (2010) (delineating the merits of the superficial opacity of standards).
159. See Lemley, supra note 34, at 317 (noting how the use of the word "reasonable"
contributes to the confusion).
160. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991)
(noting that the more the owner of a trade secret spends on protecting the secret, the more he
demonstrates the value of the secret); E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d
1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that businesses should take reasonable precautions to protect
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requirement in terms of fairness, efficiency, and consent, none of these
variables dominate the contestable idea of a "reasonable measure." 161
In the common law of idea protection, the requirement that the
idea be sufficiently "concrete" is a similar evaluative standard, where
contestation and disagreement in its application continue to exist. 162
Here too, courts use a variety of factors to assess whether an idea is
concrete enough to merit protection. No single test dominates; a
diversity of views thrives. 163
C. The Influence of Custom
Pragmatic incrementalism also insists that decisionmaking be
"situated" or contextualized. Thus, it directs judges to look to the
interaction between a legal rule and the social norms surrounding the
type of activity at issue.164 As a result, custom and practice often have
a significant influence on common law courts' formulation of a rule.'6 5
their trade secrets, but need not erect an "impenetrable fortress"); J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v.
James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 357 Mass. 728, 737-38 (1970) (reiterating that individuals who
wish to keep trade secrets must take all proper and reasonable steps to ensure secrecy); see also
1 JAGER, supra note 37, § 5:16 (examining the signaling effects of plaintiffs efforts to protect
secrecy); 1 MILGRIM, supra note 23, § 1:04 (documenting considerations that courts take into
account to determine whether this requirement is satisfied).
161. See Bone, supra note 36, at 279 n.171, 281 (observing how the "reasonableness"
standard is both open-ended and contributes to the "uncertainty" of trade secret law).
162. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 19D.06[A][1] (noting how the concept has been
used in cases in a variety of senses and presenting the argument that it is vague and uncertain).
163. See, e.g., Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 708-09 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (permitting
a cause of action where an idea is original, concrete, useful, and disclosed in circumstances
demonstrating that compensation is expected if the idea is accepted and used); Chandler v.
Roach, 319 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1957); Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 83-84 (Cal. 1950)
(approving of jury instructions that stated that a new, novel, and original abstract idea, reduced
to concrete form, may be protected by an implied contract); Jones v. Ulrich, 95 N.E.2d 113, 120
(Ill. 1950) (noting that although an idea must be concrete to a degree to enjoy protection, there is
no requirement that it be tangible and in material form); Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663,
665 (Nev. 1975) (requiring that the idea be capable of immediate use); Bailey v. Haberle-
Congress Brewing Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (Syracuse Mun. Ct. 1948) (holding that an abstract
idea can only be protected as private property when embodied in a concrete form); see also Miller,
supra note 61, at 723-26 (noting the problems with the concreteness element).
164. See Grey, supra note 106, at 41 ("Law is contextual: it is rooted in practice and custom,
and takes its substance from existing patterns of human conduct and interaction.") (emphasis
added).
165. Indeed, for long the common law was thought of as no more than customary law. See
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 125 (1925) (describing the
conception of common law as judges throwing "off the wrappings to expose" the law); A.W.B.
Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in 1 FOLK LAW: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF LEX NON SCRIPTA 119, 131 (Alison Dundes Rentelin & Alan Dundes eds., 1994)
(explaining the traditional notion of the common law as custom). This certainly isn't to imply
that customs have little or no influence in the statutory context-just that their influence is
likely to be much greater in relation to common law rule development.
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Allowing custom to inform the scope of common law rules,
though, isn't altogether without costs. For one, it may deter certain
kinds of innovative activity if its effect is entirely to expand the scope
and reach of a liability regime. 166 It may also favor one set of actors at
the expense of others. 167 Consequently, courts using custom tread
somewhat cautiously and often rely on a custom only when presented
with conclusive evidence of it being widespread and well accepted by a
broad set of actors.
Looking to customary practices and usages contextualizes the
common law process. 168 But what does such contextualization
contribute to common law intellectual property besides converting it
into a bottom-up process? First, it leads to domain-specific rules. By
enabling a rule to develop by reference to a single domain and the
ways in which actors organize themselves and interact therein, it
allows for a very high level of situational tailoring. This in turn leads
rules to vary from one context to another, thereby avoiding the use of
a one-size-fits-all approach to rule development. Secondly, custom also
reinforces a regime's antifoundationalism. By using custom in lieu of
various normative assessments, common law intellectual property
regimes allow courts to avoid having to justify their normative
decisions by reference to anything other than the specific, descriptive
reality of generally acceptable behavior.
1. Domain-Specific Tailoring
Domain specificity is custom's biggest contribution to common
law intellectual property. In intellectual property, scholars have noted
how the use of uniform rules brings with it large costs that are only
realized in the future, and, by the time these costs are realized,
minimizing them is problematic.169 This problem of "uniformity" is
endemic to most statutory, top-down regulation. The common law
process, by contrast, produces rules that originate in a bilateral
setting, which forces courts to pay attention to the circumstances of
166. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285,
304 (2008) (noting that common law rules in tort may deter liability).
167. See Eric Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1704
(1996) (noting that costs and benefits of common law rules are likely not symmetrical and that
repeat litigators will attempt to exploit the constraints on courts to maximize their own wealth).
168. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68 (equating the common law with
customary law); Simpson, supra note 165, at 131 (explaining the traditional notion of the
common law as custom).
169. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual
Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 852-56 (2006) (delineating the societal problems of uniform
costs in the context of intellectual property).
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the parties involved in the dispute. While some scholars argue that
this forces courts to ignore broader issues, 170 it undoubtedly also
results in much greater attention to detail. The use of custom to
develop legal rules is perhaps the most direct way of minimizing the
costs of uniformity.171
Additionally, the process of domain-specific tailoring enables
participants to have a greater say in the process. If the common law
method was thought to be antimajoritarian, its reliance on custom
serves to alleviate that concern to a limited extent. Customary
practices allow individuals (or participants) to organize themselves in
ways that serve their collective interests, independent of the special-
interest lobbying that accompanies that process.172 Recent studies
have shown that there exist multiple areas where largely
homogeneous groups have developed rules and practices to govern
their interactions and the sharing of informational resources that are
central to their activities. 17a The resulting equilibrium from these
rules and practices remains by and large stable. 174 However, when the
equilibrium is disrupted, common law intellectual property regimes
can restore the equilibrium by developing rules to replicate the
functioning of the custom. In the process, common law intellectual
170. Schauer, Bad Law, supra note 20, at 884.
171. See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand- Up Comedy, 94 VA.
L. REV. 1787, 1839-40 (2008) (noting how decentralized norms can serve to break intellectual
property's "one-size-fits-all straightjacket"). But see Jennifer Rothman, Custom, Comedy, and the
Value of Dissent, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 19, 20 (2009), http://www.virginialawreview.org
/inbrief/2009/04/20/Rothman.pdf (arguing that a contrary outcome is more likely).
172. Indeed this was Friedrich Hayek's basis for preferring common law to statutory law,
since to him the common law was made up entirely of rules that originate in customary practices,
what he called the evolution of a "spontaneous order." 1 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION,
AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL
ECONOMY: RULES AND ORDER 124, 124-25 (1973). See generally Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized
Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) (describing the evolution of norms in philosophical and game
theoretic terms).
173. See, e.g., Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property
Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 187 (2008) (identifying three implicit social
norms that protect intellectual property of recipes); Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: How
Magicians Protect Intellectual Property Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF
ESSAYS 123, 134-38 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010) (identifying the magic community's norm-
based intellectual property regime, which limits access, establishes norms, and enforces
violations); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 171 (documenting the existence of such customs in the
world of stand-up comedians).
174. Cf. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Fragile Equilibria, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF (2007), http://www.
virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2007/01/22/dreyfuss (suggesting some skepticism
about the stability of the resulting equilibria).
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property rules draw substantive content from the customary practices
that they seek to replicate.
International News Service illustrates this phenomenon.
Richard Epstein has argued convincingly that the case is best
understood against the backdrop of customary practices that existed
among newspapers at the time. 175 He observes how newspapers had
an unwritten norm against copying news stories from each others'
bulletin boards and print editions, but allowed headlines to be copied,
to be used as "tips" for further journalistic investigation.17 6 World War
I interfered with the equilibrium that these norms had created. 77 The
Court's opinion in International News Service was then doing little
more than reinforcing a pre-existing custom, and its solution, heavily
tailored towards time-sensitive news, corroborates this account.
It is perhaps also against this backdrop of custom that one may
understand Judge Learned Hand's reluctance to extend common law
misappropriation to the fashion industry shortly thereafter. Until the
1940s, copying in the fashion industry between competitors was
controlled rather effectively though a system of industry-wide norms
created and enforced by the Fashion Originators' Guild.178 In a well-
known decision around the same time, Judge Hand refused to extend
misappropriation to copying in the fashion world, seemingly concerned
with the issues of institutional competence and balancing. 79 Could his
reluctance be better explained by the existence of a strong system of
norms that obviated the need for common law protection? Indeed,
when the equilibrium disappeared as a consequence of the Guild being
dissolved, Judge Hand seemed more willing to recognize some kind of
protection for textile designs, this time under the rubric of traditional
statutory copyright. 80 Determining when a norms-based equilibrium
175. Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law
as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 90-94 (1992). For critiques of Epstein's
analysis, see Stephen L. Carter, Custom, Adjudication, and Petrushevsky's Watch: Some Notes
from the Intellectual Property Front, 78 VA. L. REV. 129, 131 (1992) (cautioning against a court's
enforcement of private customs regarding property rights), and Lloyd L. Weinreb, Custom, Law,
and Public Policy: The INS Case as an Example of Intellectual Property, 78 VA. L. REV. 141, 143
(1992) (critiquing Epstein's characterization of the dichotomy between positive and customary
law and Epstein's failure to adequately acknowledge the impact of spontaneous social order).
176. Epstein, supra note 175, at 95 n.24.
177. Id. at 105.
178. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1697 (2006) (noting how the Guild
"was effective at policing design piracy among its members"). The Guild was set up in 1932 and
eventually dismantled by 1941. Id. at 1697-98.
179. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929).
180. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 1960)
(allowing copyright protection for a textile design). To be sure, other factors seem to have played
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is in need of legal support is no easy task, since unnecessary
interventions can have the effect of altogether undoing the normative
significance of customary practices. 18' Perhaps this is also the reason
that various norms of information sharing and control continue to
exist in different areas, largely untouched by any legal regime.182
International News Service is a good example of a regime's
holistic domain specificity-situations where a common law regime
develops entirely to benefit a single domain. In these situations, the
normative content of the regime originates in customary practices,
and the common law then gives these practices de jure significance by
rendering them legally enforceable. Instances of holistic domain
specificity are rare.
Domain specificity can emerge from within a regime as well,
when courts exhibit a willingness to interpret a legal standard
differently for different groups of actors or resources. The use of
custom here mirrors its role in other common law contexts such as
products liability law or professional negligence.183 The rules of the
regime originate in legal directives, but courts defer to ground
realities in operationalizing the regime. Domain specificity internal to
a regime, in other words, one that emerges from within a regime, is
seen in trade secret law. To determine whether parties intended for
information to be kept secret, courts look to prevalent practices in the
industry. As is to be expected, these practices vary from one industry
to another and from one type of informational resource to another.
Courts are perfectly comfortable undertaking this granular inquiry on
a case-by-case basis.184 Common law idea protection often relies on
an important role as well, including a Supreme Court decision holding that the utilitarian nature
of an object did not preclude copyright protection over its design. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
218 (1954). Yet, Judge Hand's change in position-and the motivations for the same-have been
the subject of some scrutiny by scholars. See, e.g., Thomas Ehrlich, Copyright of Textile Designs-
Clarity and Confusion in the Second Circuit, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (1961) (noting various
points of confusion associated with Judge Hand's decision in Peter Pan).
181. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the
Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1938 (1996) (noting that "when a norm is
self-enforcing, judicial enforcement only provides opportunities for abuse without any off-setting
benefits").
182. See supra text accompanying notel75.
183. See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom
in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1992) (exploring various standards of care used when
assessing tort liability); see also Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom:
Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 164 (2000) (documenting the
use of custom in medical malpractice cases and noting the general demise of deference to
customary norms among physicians).
184. See, e.g., Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1007 (S.D. Ind. 1998)
(finding a "widespread but not uniform" custom of keeping a customer's information confidential
in the machine shop industry); Zemco Mfg. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 759 N.E. 2d 239, 250
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custom too. Here, to determine whether a recipient of a concrete and
novel idea understood the submission to have taken place under a
condition of confidentiality, courts frequently look to industry custom
to determine the existence or absence of such an understanding.18 5
Domain specificity thus involves deferring to participants in an
area for guidance. It operates as a decentralization of the lawmaking
process, allowing participants to organize themselves in the ways most
conducive to them. As with any decentralized process, its effectiveness
depends on the extent to which it is representative of the various
interests involved. When the customary practices systematically
undervalue the interests of less powerful participants-commonly
seen in situations of greater heterogeneity among actors-the
decentralization produces more problems than it does benefits. 86 This
is a common objection to the use of custom in the statutory intellectual
property context. 187 It remains less of an issue in the common law
intellectual property context, where the bilateral nature of the dispute
and the incremental process of rulemaking mitigate the potential
(Ind. App. 2001) (disallowing a claim based on industry custom in the automobile parts
industry); Machen, Inc. v. Aircraft Design, Inc., 828 P.2d 73, 78 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(discussing the existence of an industry custom of confidentiality in the aviation industry); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. b (2009) ("[T]he customs of the
particular business or industry may be sufficient to indicate to the recipient that a particular
disclosure is intended as confidential. The customary expectations surrounding the disclosure of
information in noncommercial settings may differ from those arising in connection with
disclosures in commercial contexts. The customary expectations regarding the confidentiality of
information disclosed within the research facilities of an industrial firm, for example, may differ
from those regarding disclosures in a nonprofit research laboratory.").
185. See, e.g., Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 371 (2d Cir. 2000)
("To facilitate the exchange of ideas, the standard custom and practice in the toy industry calls
for companies to treat the submission of an idea as confidential."); Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90,
93 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding a custom in the television industry that when a studio is notified of a
script, and reviews the script, it is customarily under an obligation to pay for the idea if it uses
it); Victor G. Reiling Assocs. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 175, 184 (D. Conn. 2006)
(noting the existence of this norm in the toy industry, and attributing its importance to the need
to protect individual inventors from exploitation by large toy companies); Minniear v. Tors, 266
Cal. App. 2d 495, 505 (1968) (affirming the trial court's finding of a similar custom in the
television industry).
186. See Posner, supra note 167 at 1725. (noting that the few powerful members of a group
may have more influence on the creation and enforcement of norms than the more numerous,
less powerful members); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual
Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1981 (2007) (using intellectual property to state the broader
proposition that custom may develop from rent-seeking, powerful participants).
187. See Rothman, supra note 186, at 1956-59 (critiquing the idealized view of customary
practice that fails to acknowledge that powerful interest groups might control the creation and
development of custom); Weinreb, supra note 175, at 145-47 (questioning the utility of certain
statutory provisions of intellectual property law because society knows little about "general
welfare" in the area of intellectual property).
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under-representativeness of the process. In this sense, domain
specificity contributes to the incrementalism of these regimes.
2. Using the Positive as the Normative
Using custom also facilitates common law intellectual
property's emphasis on antifoundationalism. By seeking to replicate
the ways in which actors organize themselves to solve certain
problems, courts avoid having to choose among conflicting values for
an answer. It allows them to rely on a positive claim (about what
parties do) to generate a normative answer (that parties ought to do
that which they generally do). When presented with a conflict between
efficiency, fairness, distributional concerns, and other moral ideas,
custom allows courts to fall back on practical reasoning for a solution.
This process isn't without its own set of problems. Occasionally,
courts use custom indirectly as a superficial proxy for a normative
value, without actually analyzing how that value would operate in a
given context. For instance, if a court were to conclude that a
particular solution was the most efficient merely because it was
customary in the industry or that the reason for choosing the custom
was because it was the most efficient solution, the use of custom would
have little normative significance of its own. It would operate as a
dubious proxy for an independent efficiency analysis. 88 Courts' use of
custom to this end can be contrasted with situations where they look
to custom not as evidence for an independent variable, such as
efficiency, but as the direct basis for a practical solution, rooted in the
ways actors organize themselves. The crucial difference is that here
they use the descriptive evidence of a custom as the very basis for
their solution, while in the earlier set of cases they run their
descriptive finding through the independent variable for which it is
meant to be a proxy. The distinction is thus between direct and
indirect uses of custom to derive a solution, with the latter being
problematic.189
188. In recent work, one scholar points to the problems inherent in courts' use of custom to
answer these kinds of questions in intellectual property. Rothman, supra note 186, at 1931,
1937. For a useful discussion of similar problems in the context of Internet norms, see Mark A.
Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1257, 1286 (1998)
(describing judges' lack of technological sophistication and inflexibility as barriers to effective
enforcement of norms).
189. Rothman classifies these uses of custom using terms such as "aspirational,"
"nonnormative," and the like. Rothman, supra note 186, at 1971, 1975. Yet, the direct/indirect
classification may better capture the problem here. For instance, if a custom of employee
confidentiality exists in an industry is that custom to be understood as aspirational or
nonnormative? If by nonnormative one means no more than that it is evidence of something
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Between the two processes just identified are also situations
where the regime uses standards whose normative content is widely
contested. The use of "reasonableness" as a standard in different
contexts is a perfect example of this phenomenon.190 When courts use
custom to assess the reasonableness of a solution, they certainly are
not employing the custom directly. Yet, custom isn't being used as a
proxy for an independent evaluation either, since reasonableness is by
its very nature devoid of uniform substantive content. Thus, when a
common law intellectual property regime uses reasonableness as a
variable, it provides courts with a stronger basis to analyze ways by
which actors organize themselves and solve problems within an
identified domain. While reasonableness could indeed come to be
equated with efficiency, fairness, or some other substantive value, 191 it
remains equally susceptible to analysis in practical terms, thereby
allowing courts to sidestep having to choose between competing
conceptions. In this way, the use of custom serves to complement the
idea of antifoundationalism. Trade secret law's requirement of
"reasonable measures of precaution" remains a perfect illustration of
this phenomenon. In avoiding having to define "reasonable" in terms
of efficiency, cost-effectiveness, or some other variable, courts look to
actual practice within the relevant industry to assess the
reasonableness of the plaintiffs actions. 192
Custom thus allows common law intellectual property regimes
to rely on current practices among actors in an area as the basis for
their rule development. This doesn't imply that the process merely
reinforces the status quo by allowing little or no change over time. A
other than its own existence-such as efficiency-then, it collapses back onto the direct/indirect
distinction.
190. See id. at 1975 (noting how the use of custom here might be of some utility).
191. Indeed, problematic instances where courts use custom as a proxy for reasonableness
are on closer analysis those where custom is used as a proxy for an independent value, i.e.,
situations where the addition of a reasonableness test does little more than obfuscate the inquiry
and add a dimension of contestability when in reality none ought to exist. Courts' use of custom
in the fair use context, where the "fairness" of the use-rather than its reasonableness-is the
mandated standard, illustrates this point. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) (conflating the "reasonableness" of a use with its "fairness," and thereby
introducing a counterargument by The Nation that its use, while against custom, was not
unreasonable); Rothman, supra note 186, at 1941 (discussing the differences between a
reasonable use and a fair use in the context of intellectual property).
192. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985) (requiring that the
information in question be "the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy"); see also Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000-07 (S.D.
Ind. 1998) (finding that the requirement had not been met since the plaintiff had not followed
the basic industry practice of indicating that the drawings in question were confidential); Elm
City Cheese Co. v. Federico, 752 A.2d 1037, 1049-50 (Conn. 1999) (setting out commonly used
methods of protecting secrecy in analyzing the requirement).
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status quo approach of this sort would come about only if courts were
to interpret the concept of "custom" differently from that of industry
norms and practices. 193 There seems to be little reason to believe that
common law intellectual property regimes adopt such a narrow
conception of custom. 1 94 By contrast, courts seem well aware that
customs are dynamic and as a consequence, look to how "widespread,"
pervasive, or uniform a custom is, before modeling their rule on it.195
D. Integrating the Ex Ante with the Ex Post
Legal pragmatism insists that adjudication be "forward-
looking," that it pay close attention to its social consequences, and that
judges decide on the precise formulation of a rule based on evidence of
these consequences.19 6 Yet, unlike lawmaking in the legislative or
administrative context, common law rulemaking is constrained by the
specifics of the dispute before a court. Common law courts therefore
have to combine the instrumentalism of their rule formulation with
the backward-looking nature of adjudication.
This has two consequences. First, it causes courts to view the
future through the present. By restricting their decisionmaking to the
dispute at hand, it focuses any rulemaking that comes about through
that process on circumstances analogous to those before them.197
Second, it also forces courts to analyze the present through the
perspective of the future. This involves judges adopting an ex ante
perspective in their analysis of the dispute before them.198 When
193. See Richard A. Posner, Hayek, Law, and Cognition, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 147, 152
(2005) (observing how "custom" may fail to keep up with changing economic or social practices).
194. See Posner, supra note 92, at 1657 ("[T]he law is forward-looking.").
195. See, e.g., Flotec, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 (holding that a "widespread but not
uniform practice" of keeping customer information confidential was not adequate grounds for
infringement of trade secrets in the machine shop industry).
196. See Posner, supra note 92, at 1657 ("[The] law is forward-looking.").
197. See Holmes, supra note 108, at 1 ("It is the merit of the common law that it decides the
case first and determines the principle afterwards."); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986
Term: Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 89 (1987) ("In the process of personal
reflection, however, the judge may stretch faculties for connection, while engaging in dialogue
with the parties over their legal arguments and analogies."); Schauer, Bad Law, supra note 20,
at 883 (noting how lawmaking in the common law is contextualized through individual disputes);
Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 417
(1995) (observing how the appellate courts discharge their lawmaking function at times through
issues needing such lawmaking being brought to their attention by litigants in individual cases).
198. For an overview of the ex ante approach to adjudication, see Frank H. Easterbrook,
Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARY. L. REV. 4, 10-12 (1984), and Frank H.
Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622, 622 (1985). My
account of the ex ante perspective differs from Easterbrook's formulation. His approach tends to
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presented with a dispute, common law judges factor the effects of the
law into their rule- and decisionmaking. Additionally, they do this not
just for the future, but in their analysis of the past as well. In other
words, they examine how a prior rule is likely to have impacted
parties' actions, resulting in the dispute before them. They use this
then to understand the rule's future consequences. Thus, the forward-
looking nature of the process isn't only future-oriented. It also entails
examining past precedents for their consequences manifested in the
present.
Courts developing common law intellectual property regimes
often make a concerted effort to do more than just achieve justice
between parties to a dispute. This is especially so when the regime
relates to a rapidly changing area of activity. In these situations,
courts focus on the future consequences of their decisions and the
impact it is likely to have on actors in the area.
Courts examine the consequences of common law intellectual
property rules in three principal ways. The first involves analyzing the
legal regime in question as a system that exists principally as a future
inducement for certain kinds of behavior. This analysis is only mildly
instrumental, since the incentive effects are attributed to the regime
in the aggregate and not to individualized decisions that courts
themselves make in applying the regime. The idea of incentives is
offered here at the theoretical, rather than practical, level. 199 Common
law intellectual property regimes routinely employ the idea of
incentives to this end, as do other areas of intellectual property. 200
A second method of analyzing a regime's consequences involves
examining how individual decisions and their holdings might impact
actors in a certain area. This analysis differs from a focus on the
system's aggregate effects in that the consequences it looks to are
short-term, and largely immediate in nature. Courts' analysis of the
"reasonable measure of secrecy" rule in trade secret law is a good
correspond roughly to Posner's concept of forward-looking decisionmaking, rather than involving
an analysis of the actual dispute in terms of the ex ante effects of past precedents.
199. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1569, 1577 (2009) (noting the extensive use of incentives rhetoric in current copyright law).
200. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (observing
how the right of publicity provides an "economic incentive" to invest in a performance); Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1974) (observing how trade secret law will serve to
"encourage invention" in areas); U.S. Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d
1028, 1035 (3d Cir. 1984) (describing the misappropriation doctrine as providing creators of
intellectual property with "necessary incentives"). For scholarly arguments in a similar vein, see
1 McCARTHY, supra note 23, § 2:6 (discussing the incentive justification for publicity rights);
Lemley, supra note 34, at 329-37 (arguing that trade secret law provides actors with an
incentive to invent and disclose); Miller, supra note 61, at 711-15 (justifying common law idea
protection in terms of the incentives it provides creators of ideas).
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example. In determining whether a plaintiff took reasonable measures
to protect the information in question, courts are often very cautious
about placing the burden of secrecy too high, worried that doing so
would result in an inefficiently excessive investment in secrecy
measures. 201 The consequence that their decision cares about is the
investment in secrecy, which is different from the aggregate effect of
the regime: the inducement to invest in innovative activity that
generates valuable information. 202 This form of analysis is moderately
instrumental in the pragmatic sense, since its short-term focus could
detract from the system's long-term consequences.
The third and perhaps most meaningful focus on consequences
entails courts aligning the immediate effects of their decisions with
the intended long-term effects of the regime as a whole. This involves
two steps. In the first, courts accept the idea that a regime is directed
at influencing primary behavior of a certain kind-in the aggregate
and over time. In the second, they examine: (1) the extent to which the
parties' actions were aligned with the effects that the system intended,
and (2) how their own decision in the case is likely to contribute to or
detract from the system's incentive effects. In a negligence case, it
would thus entail courts first recognizing that the law is directed at
inducing actors to invest in efficient precautions. Then, in deciding an
individual case, courts would examine whether parties were actually
influenced to invest in such precautions and how their decision would
contribute towards parties making such investments in the future.203
While common law courts rarely go through these steps in practice
while adjudicating tort, contract, or property claims, they frequently
undertake just such an analysis in common law intellectual property.
This form of analysis is most strongly instrumental in the pragmatic
sense.
The clearest example of this approach is seen in the law of
misappropriation, as formulated by the Second Circuit. 204 One of the
201. See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 725 (7th Cir.
2003) (observing how the requirement depends on a balancing of costs and benefits); E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting how requiring
the defendant to do more than it had would "impose an enormous expense" and that the court did
not want to "burden industrial inventors with such a duty").
202. Cf. Lemley, supra note 34, at 342-44 (noting the centrality of secrecy to the incentive
justification for trade secret law).
203. Some argue that courts do precisely this, under a theory of untaken precautions. See
Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 139 (1989) ("The key question that
courts ask is what particular precautions the defendant could have taken but did not."); see also
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 246 (1987)
(arguing the same under a theory of marginal cost-benefit analysis).
204. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
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elements for a valid misappropriation claim, under the court's
formulation, is a showing that "the ability of other parties to free-ride
on the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to
produce the product or service that its existence or quality would be
substantially threatened."205 The formulation thus accepts that one of
the regime's objectives may indeed be to induce the production of a
product or service. It then forces courts to analyze that systemic goal
through the dispute being decided. Cumbersome as it may seem,
courts seem to have found few problems in undertaking an analysis
along these lines, recognizing that the analysis of a regime's
consequences ought to be of more than just of rhetorical
significance. 206
Misappropriation law certainly isn't the only place where we
see this type of analysis. Publicity law is another. While the incentives
argument is often used to justify publicity rights, courts have on
occasion stopped to ask whether the invocation of publicity rights in
the case before them would serve to further the incentive effects
claimed by the system, and on that basis have either extended or
limited the application of the regime. 207 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major
League Baseball Players Association illustrates this point.208 There, in
balancing the plaintiffs claims against the defendant's free speech
rights, the court examined whether denying the plaintiffs claim would
reduce the incentive effects commonly imputed to the regime and
concluded that in cases where no performance was involved, the
incentive effect was "strained" and "less compelling" and that granting
the plaintiff protection might have a harmful "chilling effect" on future
speech. On that basis, it denied the plaintiff protection. 209 This
example also illustrates that the consequences being considered often
extend to those not just for the plaintiff, but also for the defendant.
Other courts have adopted near identical analyses.210
205. Id. at 845.
206. See, e.g., U.S. Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1034-41
(3d Cir. 1984) (denying a misappropriation claim based on a lack of "direct competition"); X17,
Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (applying the multi-factor NBA
analysis in a misappropriation case); Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal.
2000) (same); Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044,
1050 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (same).
207. But see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 2:6 (criticizing its use here on the argument that
such an analysis is never undertaken in the patent and copyright contexts).
208. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
209. Id. at 974.
210. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824
(8th Cir. 2007) (using the framework of Cardtoons to analyze publicity rights pertaining to a
fantasy baseball service); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) (same,
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The various techniques described above and their relation to
pragmatic incrementalism's main ideas are summarized by the
following table.











III. LESSONS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REFORM
The functioning of pragmatic incrementalism in common law
intellectual property holds several important lessons for intellectual
property law reform efforts. It points to creative possibilities that
intellectual property lawmaking ought to consider as genuine options,
either in addition to or in lieu of features prevalent in the current
system. Given the inadequacies of the current patent and copyright
regimes, and the widely recognized impracticability of radical reform
from within their current frameworks, looking to common law
intellectual property might provide lawmakers with important
structural and substantive possibilities to consider. This Part details
some of them.
A. Institutional Choice and Design
Questions of institutional choice-of determining the
appropriate distribution of lawmaking power between different
pertaining to artwork of Tiger Woods); Frazier v. Boomsma, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1779 (D. Ariz.
2007) (same, pertaining to publicity rights of soldiers who died in Iraq).
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lawmaking institutions-have received surprisingly little attention in
intellectual property. 211 The practical reality that legislatures have
taken the lead in determining the shape and content of the law
influences the way in which most participants in the system approach
the mechanics of legal change. When any interest group today
contemplates changing the law, its primary target remains the
legislative branch. 212 Rarely are courts, whether at the federal or state
level, considered appropriate stand-alone venues for intellectual
property law reform. Perhaps more importantly, though, intellectual
property reform efforts have increasingly come to spend very little
time and effort on the question of when the judicial process might be a
better avenue for legal change than the legislative one. Legislative
reform remains the norm, while reform through courts is considered
an exception, or, at best, a supplement. The working of common law
intellectual property regimes, at the very least, suggests there may be
areas within intellectual property where courts are as well equipped
as (if not better than) legislatures at lawmaking. The remainder of
this Section will discuss the choice between legislative certainty and
common law flexibility, and the interaction between the two.
Legislatures certainly have distinct advantages. As
democratically elected institutions, they are well suited to represent
the multiple interests involved in intellectual property law and to
reach compromises when necessary. Their directives are often
universal in application, decisive on the appropriate trade-off between
competing values, and, above all else, certain-enabling actors to plan
their actions accordingly. Additionally, legislatures are particularly
well suited for collecting and gathering information from different
participants in an area, without being restricted to the specific parties
of a dispute. All the same, their working has its costs. For one, law
reform through the legislative process takes time. 213 Recognizing this,
legislatures are commonly reluctant (in the intellectual property
context) to make minor, incremental changes to the law on a sustained
basis. Additionally, intellectual property law reform through
legislatures is prone to special interest group pressures, often
211. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5-6 (1997) (observing how issues of institutional choice
receive very little systematic attention in the law generally).
212. This accounts for the innumerable amendments to both the patent and copyright
statutes. See supra note 1. In recent times, this has certainly come to be supplemented by a very
large number of amicus briefs filed in leading intellectual property cases.
213. See Green, supra note 138, at 121-22 (observing this phenomenon in the context of tort
law and arguing that it favors judicial law-making in the area).
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resulting in gridlocks and stalemates. 214 Thus, while legislative
rulemaking comes with a high level of certainty, it often compromises
on flexibility, in an effort to avoid incurring the costs of the legislative
process on a repeated basis.
In contrast, common law courts create rules from the context of
a specific dispute. The rulemaking is thus "situated" in the sense that
it takes the dispute as representative of a larger phenomenon and
extrapolates to the future from there. 215 The doctrines of stare decisis
and ratio decidendi serve to constrain the court's freedom in
significant ways, ensuring that the exercise of any delegated
discretion is undertaken in a largely principled way. This process of
decisionmaking, with its enabling and constraining features, forces
courts to proceed tentatively, in small steps, but with a high degree of
precision. Since the process of rulemaking is invariably ex post, to the
individual actor the law remains uncertain until a decision is actually
rendered. This uncertainty could in turn have its own distinct set of
incentive-related costs, since it might interfere with the ability of
actors to plan their future undertakings. The common law process
thus comes with a very high degree of flexibility, but compromises on
certainty.
In a reform initiative, one of the first points of comparison
must therefore be the relative costs and benefits of flexibility and
certainty to the area or question under consideration. No doubt, the
analysis will reveal that, for a large number of areas and questions in
intellectual property, the need for certainty will dominate. Basic
issues such as the very availability of protection, the duration of such
protection, and the nature of the rights it grants its holder-would
benefit more from a rule-based rather than a case-by-case approach.
These are indeed questions for which the demands of certainty
outweigh the advantages of flexibility, from a purely ex ante incentive
point of view for both plaintiffs and defendants. It is perhaps for this
reason that a large number of states have thought it necessary to
codify some of these basic questions even within the domain of court-
created intellectual property.
214. Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-
2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2234 (2000) (reviewing the "abundant evidence" of rent-seeking by
special-interest groups in the realm of "IP legislation"); William F. Patry, Copyright and the
Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (1996)
(describing the extreme lobbying efforts of interest groups in the copyright lawmaking process).
215. The most cogent exposition of the idea can be traced back to the work of Karl Llewellyn,
who emphasized the importance of a strong "situation sense" among common law judges. To him,
situation sense entailed identifying relevant features in a set of facts, appreciating their social
significance and thereupon approaching the case as an instantiation of a broader phenomenon.
See LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 268-85, 447-48.
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On the other hand, the certainty that tends to accompany the
legislative process remains heavily dependent on the availability of
information. And indeed when such information is available, the
legislative process is superior to the judicial process in gathering it,
notwithstanding the routine use of amicus brief filings by third parties
in intellectual property cases. 216 There are however a large number of
situations where such information is either unavailable, incapable of
being measured, assessed, or compared, or is of questionable currency.
Several factors may contribute to this, including the wide variety of
parties' actions and their consequences, changing technology and
social norms, and conflicting normative views and values on an issue.
To favor certainty in these situations is likely to result in the law
being grossly underinclusive or insensitive to the diversity of
incommensurable preferences in society, thereby undermining its
legitimacy. The analysis of common law intellectual property reveals
how flexibility in the law can produce uniformity in principle, without
degenerating into ad hoc decisionmaking. As situations change from
one context to another and over time, a flexible, context-sensitive
approach allows a legal regime to expand as needed, without striving
for ex ante prescience.
Tort law, for instance, has remained a flexible common-law-
based body of law, in large part due to the extreme variations in facts
that courts encounter. To systematize the law with anything but open-
ended principles would leave courts with very little room to adapt the
law to new situations as they arise. One sees the same in common law
intellectual property. Norms of "secrecy" or "confidentiality" and the
methods employed tend to show extreme variability, eluding rule-
based regulation.
The inadequacy of information because of a divergence in
values is a less appreciated side of the same problem. When the
underlying value framework for an area or its theoretical basis
remains uncertain in society and among participants, the imposition
of certainty there will produce artificial results or those contrary to
the ones intended. For long, the regulation of cyberspace was thought
to necessitate favoring flexibility over certainty for precisely this
reason. 217 In that context, scholars came to favor a common law,
216. See generally WILLIM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 19-20 (2004) (detailing the number of such amicus filings in
intellectual property cases between 1980 and 2003).
217. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744-45 (1995) (noting
a gulf between the known interests and the potential interests at stake in cyberspace); Suzanna
Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV.
309, 316-17 (2002) (arguing for common law solutions, rather than federal regulation, for
1594 [Vol. 63:6:1543
COMMON LAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
incremental approach that allowed courts to experiment with rules on
a tentative, case-by-case basis until the core values underlying
internet participation became clear and the consequences of
implementing them predictable. Scholars have advocated similar
approaches to the First and Fourth Amendments as well, where
disagreement over values is pervasive. 218 An example of this
phenomenon can be seen in the world of intellectual property too.
Contrast in this respect, the competing availability of a free speech (in
other words, First Amendment-related) defense in copyright law and
the law of publicity rights. Copyright law, developed as a rule-based
framework, continues to struggle with cases where a defendant
presents a free speech argument, with courts having to fit their
analysis into the terms of the fair use doctrine. The law of publicity, in
contrast, developed in flexible common law terms, allowing courts to
give free speech concerns far more salience. This has enabled courts to
craft new exceptions and defenses, the most notable of which is the
"newsworthiness" defense, largely unheard of in copyright
jurisprudence.
The flexibility-certainty trade-off in many ways tracks the
rules versus standards debate in legal theory. Yet, it does more than
that. It points to the fact that in certain domains flexibility may not
just be necessary, but also beneficial-by forcing a deeper and more
sustained consideration of the issues at stake. Determining when
flexibility is preferable to certainty in intellectual property and vice-
versa is, to be sure, no easy or formulaic task. Yet, it is not without a
corpus to draw from either. And this is where looking to common law
intellectual property and its use of a flexible approach in different
domains could prove helpful.
Perhaps more importantly, what often goes unnoticed is that
flexible common law rulemaking need not be completely independent
of legislative action dealing with areas of a regime where certainty is
needed. It can remain interstitial and coexist with legislative
enactments in an area. Copyright law's fair use doctrine and
substantial similarity requirement are good examples here. In these
situations, for pragmatic incrementalism to function effectively, the
cyberspace issues). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 883-87 (2004) (arguing
that when it comes to criminal law, the common law method shouldn't be applied to cyberlaw).
218. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of
Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1149, 1149-51 (1998)
(making an analogous argument in the Fourth Amendment context); Daniel A. Farber & Philip
P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1615-17 (1987)
(making the argument in relation to the First Amendment).
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legislature needs to "empower" courts, or be seen as delegating actual
common law rulemaking power to them.219 Such empowering statutes
would thus favor the use of standards, as opposed to rules.
Additionally, in their framing of standards, they might choose to
employ highly contestable concepts that are capable of accommodating
multiple values when invoked (for example, "reasonableness").
While the functioning of common law intellectual property as
described in this Article certainly does not make the case for the
superiority of judicial lawmaking in the area, at the very least it
points to the exaggeration of claims that courts are ill-equipped to
answer these questions. Substantive reform efforts would thus do well
to integrate a study of relative institutional strengths and weaknesses
before moving forward, recognizing that there might indeed be
domains where change is better served incrementally through the
judicial process, or that a collaborative exercise between courts and
legislatures (for example, the fair use doctrine) would prove more
effective in the long run. In situations of uncertainty, when the lack of
information or the conflict of basic values demands a cautionary,
tentative approach on an issue, the law would do well in entrusting to
courts to develop rules as they have in the regimes described
previously.
It is also worth emphasizing that the method of pragmatic
incrementalism described herein does not automatically point in the
direction of courts (federal or state) for its instantiation.
Administrative agencies acting in their quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
capacities might be equally well positioned to incorporate its core
tenets and techniques. One might thus see the method working
equally well in the context of a specialized intellectual property
tribunal, where rules are generated from the context of the dispute,
with a strong reliance on precedent and common law reasoning
techniques. We must remember, however, that it is not just dispute-
based rulemaking that results in the process being pragmatic and
incremental. Structural norms such as stare decisis, precedent,
analogical reasoning, and the use of formalist common law concepts as
instrumental place-holders remain equally central. Courts and the
judicial process are structured to exhibit these characteristics
naturally. To the extent that other bodies model themselves on courts
in these respects, the method of pragmatic incrementalism is likely to
219. Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 428-34 (2008) (describing the phenomenon of
delegating to courts).
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work there too. It too, at a minimum, would point to bodies other than
legislatures as sources of intellectual property law reform.
B. Valuing Practical Reasoning
Today, courts, scholars, policymakers, and the general public
disagree about intellectual property's basic purpose. What is the
system trying to achieve? The search for a grand theory to justify the
institution has eluded scholars and practitioners for decades, if not
centuries. 220 While the economic analysis of intellectual property today
dominates the landscape, it isn't without its own set of rather
significant shortcomings. 2 21
The pragmatic incrementalism of common law intellectual
property regimes tells us that we do not need to worry about choosing
between these different values and goals for all times to come, and
that a single system can accommodate them all. The emphasis that it
places on practical reasoning as a mechanism of balancing different
substantive values serves to minimize the effects of any trade-off or
prioritization that is necessary. It also cautions against placing too
much reliance on theoretical coherence as a precondition to
institutional design.
What is practical reasoning though? Practical reasoning
involves an eclectic approach to problem solving and avoids deciding
an issue deductively by reference to a unifying principle. As an idea, it
is often traced back to Aristotle and the belief that determining what
is right (and necessary) in a situation does not require a universal
theory of what is right.222 Instead, people make decisions by choosing,
comparing, and balancing multiple principles as they relate to the
problem at hand.2 2 3 Practical reasoning thus rejects both legal
formalism and legal foundationalism. 224 It asks courts to focus on the
dispute, and to use the reality of the controversy before them to think
about the law that they are expounding on. It emphasizes the reality
220. See Sunder, supra note 19, at 259-60 ("[T]here are no 'giant-sized' intellectual property
theories . . . .").
221. For an overview of the problems in the copyright context, see Balganesh, supra note
199, 1572-76. See also MADHAVI SUNDER, IP: YouTUBE, MYSPACE, OUR CULTURE (forthcoming
2010).
222. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, chs. 5-11 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962)
(understanding this idea in terms of the concept of phronesis).
223. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and
the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 536 (1992) ("[T]he judge could approach the case as an
example of a broader situation, giving the particular facts of the case some weight but assessing
them in regard to the broader implications of the case.").
224. Id. at 539.
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of the controversy rather than the specifics of the controversy, an
important distinction. The latter would have judges adopt a narrow
view of their task, related exclusively to doing justice between the
parties, while the former would have courts fit the dispute into a
broader category to understand the wider real-world implications of
their individual adjudication. 225
The Court's approach in International News very well
illustrates the use of practical reasoning. When faced with the reality
of free riding between competitors in the news industry, the Court was
neither presented with, nor indeed sought, a single theory for its
decision on quasi property. It consciously rejected the formalist
concept of "property in news," recognizing that it was doing something
vastly different. 226 At the same time, the Court did more than just
balance the equities involved in the case for which a pure property
interest in news would have been adequate. Instead, it tailored its rule
to avoid running up against free speech and other public interest
concerns. 227 In the decades since the decision, scholars have struggled
to articulate a grand theory to explain Justice Pitney's reasoning in
the case. They note that the opinion uses ideas from corrective justice,
distributional fairness, unjust enrichment, and unfairness in
competition, but fails to incorporate them all into a unified
framework. 228 Yet, this eclecticism is indeed laudable; it effectively
225. Llewellyn made much of this point in his description of the common law system of
analysis. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 301
(Transaction Publishers 2008) (1962) ("[T]he common law court deals not only with the
particular decision, but with the rule which is to become a precedent and guide the future."). The
importance of the reality of the controversy in allowing courts to sense the consequences of their
decisions has been noted by others on several occasions as well. See Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (noting that the
redressability component of standing helps ensure that legal questions are resolved "in a
concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial
action"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 241-64 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (closely examining
factual background of the disparity in voting representation across Tennessee counties). But see
Frederick Schauer & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Trouble with Cases 15 (Va. Law & Econ. Res.
Paper, No. 2009-09, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1446897 (detailing the problems
of under-representativeness that this entails).
226. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234-35 (1918) ("We need spend no
time, however, upon the general question of property in news matter at common law, or the
application of the copyright act, since it seems to us the case must turn upon the question of
unfair competition in business.").
227. Id. at 236 ("Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which both parties
are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same field, we hardly can fail to
recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be regarded as quasi property,
irrespective of the rights of either as against the public.").
228. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 2, at 411 (noting how the danger of the Court's approach lay
in its not being clear about the real interest being protected); Rudolf Callmann, He Who Reaps
Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HARv. L. REV.
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allowed multiple variables to play out in the area-all of which subsist
today, with little negative impact on the robustness of the doctrine.
Eclecticism and practical reasoning, however, should not be
confused with an entirely ad hoc approach to decisionmaking. 229
Practical reasoning is not the same as unprincipled decisionmaking.
Rather, it involves employing experience and expertise to disaggregate
a complex situation and then reconstruct it based on categories and
ideas that have arisen in the past. As some have argued, it involves
more than just bare intuition and entails the process of "sophisticated
pattern recognition." 230 Others have described its functioning in terms
of hermeneutical theory.231
As a process, practical reasoning entails embracing the
pluralism of values and ideals underlying an area, but working
through the complexity of the situation inductively through its
context. Through the focus on context, the abstract inconsistency of
multiple values comes to be overshadowed by their practical
compatibility. In recent work, Joseph Singer argues that practical
reasoning is the primary way that judges and lawyers, unlike
theorists and philosophers, approach the task of decisionmaking. 232 To
Singer, the essence of practical reasoning lies in providing
decisionmakers with a way to balance incommensurables. He
identifies three ways by which this is achieved.233 The first involves
the direct balancing of competing interests.234 A balancing approach is
most suited to situations where the parties' interests can be
understood along a single variable that the decisionmaker determines
is to be prioritized up front. A cost-benefit analysis, such as
595, 597 (1942) (noting how the case relied on a theory of unjust enrichment for its decision);
Gordon, supra note 2, at 266-67 (observing how the decision had two rationales, one deriving
from fairness and the other from economic reasoning).
229. For this criticism of practical reasoning, see Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman,
Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous
Implications, 79 CAL. L. REV. 267, 290 n.132 (1991); Stephen D. Smith, The Pursuit of
Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 434-37 (1990); David E. Van Zandt, An Alternative Theory of
Practical Reason in Judicial Decisions, 65 TUL. L. REV. 775, 791 (1991).
230. Farber, supra note 223, at 555-56.
231. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 322 (1990) (applying practical reasoning to statutory
interpretation); Farber & Frickey, supra note 218, at 1616 (applying practical reasoning to
interpretation of the first amendment); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical
Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990)
(applying practical reasoning to federal Indian law).
232. See Singer, supra note 136, at 944 ("Lawyers recognize that we have plural,
incommensurable values and that we generally hold to a form of practical reason to decide hard
cases in a practical manner.").
233. Id. at 972-73.
234. Id. at 973-74.
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intellectual property's incentives-access trade-off would fit this
category. The second involves the idea of "contractualism," or the use
of widely recognized ideas of rightness and wrongness to arrive at a
decision and justify it.235 To Singer, in the legal context, this involves
that process of "reversing roles"-or trying to understand the decision
in terms of the other side's context, in other words, on the assumption
that a party's normative preferences aren't capable of being
determined.236 This ideal is then represented in the way that judges in
the common law tradition often work hard to explain the reasoning
behind their decisions, even when they don't have to do so.
The third mechanism that Singer identifies uses Rawls's idea
of the "reflective equilibrium."237 The method of arriving at a reflective
equilibrium entails moving back and forth between the general and
the specific, and allowing modification and updating at both ends of
that process. The decisionmaker deems the outcome acceptable when
he achieves sufficient coherence through this back and forth. The back
and forth process combines inductive, deductive, and analogical
reasoning in the decisionmaking process.
Applying Singer's mechanisms to intellectual property
lawmaking reveals several important lessons. To begin with, it would
imply that the system need not prioritize certain values over others up
front, but can instead hope to achieve a harmonious balance between
them within the institution and over time. It involves recognizing the
existence of multiple, equally viable, theoretical values for an
institution, and then looking to how each is likely to work in the
context of the case being decided. Judges test the implications of each
value against the likely short- and long-term practical effects of their
decision. In the process, they update their choice of value framework,
modify its exclusivity, and perhaps even achieve a balance between
multiple values in the context of a single decision. Central to the
entire process is thus an abandonment of the idea that the rule-
development and decisionmaking processes necessitate abstract
theoretical coherence, and a recognition that the needs of deciding the
case at hand force a consideration and comparison of multiple
perspectives. The coherence of the process lies in the contextual
balance between the general and the specific that it achieves for
different informational resources and contexts.
235. The idea is commonly associated with the work of T.M. Scanlon. See THOMAS M.
SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 153 (1998).
236. Singer, supra note 136, at 975.
237. Id. at 976-77.
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In concrete terms, this suggests that intellectual property law
would benefit from placing more reliance on practical, problem-solving
techniques rather than theoretical consistency. For decades now,
Congress and the federal courts have framed their discussion of the
subject using uniform foundational values, even when logic and
common sense point them elsewhere-all in the name of coherence.
Yet, the functioning of common law intellectual property ought to
point to the reality that value pluralism and contestability are
perfectly compatible with a well-functioning system of intellectual
property rules.
IV. OBJECTIONS
The preceding parts of this Article have developed a model of
judicial lawmaking from the working of common law intellectual
property and have argued that it holds important lessons for the
future of intellectual property reform efforts. This Part anticipates
and responds to possible objections to the argument. Much like the
theory of pragmatic incrementalism itself, the objections are both
structural and substantive in nature: (1) that pragmatic
incrementalism is inherently conservative; (2) that common law
intellectual property operates at the margins of the intellectual
property system; and (3) that my defense of it underplays the
deficiencies of the common law.
A. Pragmatic Incrementalism Is Inherently Conservative
At first glance, the working of pragmatic incrementalism may
seem diametrically opposed to change as an idea, and certainly
antagonistic to radical change. Given its emphasis on small steps and
incremental development over time, it certainly has overtones of
Burkean conservatism-in a methodological, rather than ideological
sense.238 Yet, paradoxical as it may seem, pragmatic incrementalism is
capable of being employed to bring about genuine change in the status
quo.
The idea of incremental change in the common law comes with
the recognition that when circumstances demand, the extent of the
change can indeed be significant. 239 Even when significant, the change
238. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 74 (Frank M. Turner ed.,
Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1790); Sunstein, Minimalism, supra note 98, at 371.
239. As some have observed, Burke himself recognized the need for such change as society
changes. BURKE, supra note 238, at 19, 51-52. For an interesting application of Burkean thought
to patent law, see Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY
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remains incremental in the sense that it develops from the
accumulation of knowledge and information about the area over time.
Decisions such as Palsgraf, MacPherson, and International News, all
prominent examples of pragmatic incrementalism, did anything but
affirm the status quo. Nonetheless, the extent of the change they
introduced remained incremental in the use of ideas, concepts, and
principles that were in existence and had been developed by the
common law over an extended period of time. In other words, these
decisions were radical, yet incremental.
Additionally, incrementalism is hardly opposed to the idea of
overruling precedent when necessary. Yet, overruling too can be
incremental-when it recognizes that the idea underlying a previous
case has come to be whittled away in spirit (even if not in express
terms) by practice and holdings since. 240 Like Burkean minimalism,
pragmatic incrementalism cautions against decisionmaking in
situations of extreme uncertainty, especially when completely unaided
by information. Yet, as a theory about the judicial process,
incrementalism is equally suspicious of such decisionmaking
regardless of ideology, be it intellectual property minimalist or
maximalist.
Even if incrementalism is largely Burkean, its interface with
pragmatism as a way of thinking about a problem in antifoundational
terms actively facilitates change of a different kind. Accusations of
conservatism and of biasing the status quo have long been leveled
against pragmatism as a philosophical movement. 241 Responding to
portions of this criticism in a short essay, Richard Rorty succinctly
observed that social change to pragmatism comes about by focusing on
the real-world consequences of an idea, rather than by laying claim to
TECH. L.J. 855, 858 (2007) ("[S]ome of the general themes found in Burke's writing ... may shed
some light on some contemporary debates about the scope of patentable subject matter.").
240. In a recent opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer dissented from the majority's
opinion which overruled a century-old precedent, noting that the process of overruling had to be
incremental, and pointing to Cardozo's approach as paradigmatic of this process. See Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 928 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
241. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, "Just Do It"- Pragmatism and Progressive Social Change, 78
VA. L. REV. 697, 697 (1992) ("[P]ragmatism is of scant use for achieving progressive social
change."); Allan C. Hutchinson, The Three 'Rs': Reading/Rorty/Radically, 103 HARV. L. REV.
555, 583 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989)) ("Law
does the same for practical reason as philosophy does for reasoning at large; it attempts to turn
it into a falsely privileged mode of discourse."); Joseph W. Singer, Should Lawyers Care About
Philosophy?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1752, 1759 (reviewing RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND
SOLIDARITY (1989)) ("By separating philosophy from justice, Rorty's vision reinforces existing
power relations that illegitimately oppress and exclude large segments of the population.").
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its truth or authority.242 Indeed, pragmatic incrementalism is in
similar terms forward-looking, driven by its consequences for actors
likely to be guided by the law's normative (or guidance) power. As an
antifoundational approach to rulemaking, it actively disavows reliance
on a grand theoretical framework to reach a decision, but instead
focuses attention on the pluralism of values and theories that operate
under the normative structure of the law. In this respect too, it draws
from pragmatism as a philosophy, which Rorty describes as
principally "negative and renunciatory."243
In the intellectual property context, pragmatic
incrementalism's focus on epistemological pluralism is likely to bring
about rather significant social change. With the ideas of ownership,
economic incentives, and efficiency coming to dominate the way in
which courts think about and apply the copyright and patent systems
today, pragmatic incrementalism, as an antifoundational approach to
rulemaking, is likely to force a recognition of the plurality of values
and concerns at stake in the area. The amount of change enabled by
any approach is entirely a factor of what the baseline for the change
is. Given the foundationalism at work in different parts of intellectual
property, pragmatic incrementalism can at the very least ensure a
methodological shift in the way in which intellectual property rights
are conceived and operationalized. Whether this comes about one case
at a time, over a period of time, or through the gradual relinquishment
of foundationalist rhetoric, it certainly constitutes change.
B. The Marginality of Common Law Intellectual Property
A second possible objection derives from the fact that the
regimes described previously are all creatures of state law, likely to be
preempted in different ways by federal intellectual property law. To
some this might imply that these areas, though once robust, today
operate in the interstices of the intellectual property system largely in
recognition of their fragmented, common law development. In other
words, their marginalization might be thought of as a consequence of
their structural attributes, many of which the argument here extols.
Additionally, to the extent that the three main federal intellectual
property regimes could in theory preempt these state common law
regimes, it might be seen as little more than a matter of time before
242. Richard Rorty, What Can You Expect from Anti-Foundationalist Philosophers?: A Reply
to Lynn Baker, 78 VA. L. REV. 719, 719 (1992) ("They defend their proposals not solely in terms of
how much we would like the consequences of the change they propose . . . but also by reference to
the authority of that for which they speak.").
243. Id. at 724.
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Congress decides to replace or eliminate these laws altogether in
recognition of these deficiencies.
Federal preemption is no doubt an important issue in the
intellectual property context; and indeed many of the regimes
described have shrunk in significance as a consequence of it.244 Yet,
the fact of the matter is that the common law intellectual property
regimes that subsist today do so because they are thought to have a
legitimate role in the intellectual property landscape. In other words,
their structural and functional attributes are thought to be
independently significant so as to warrant being preserved.
Trade secret law is perhaps the best example of this. In the
1974 case of Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. for instance, when
presented with the question of whether state trade secret law ought to
be preempted, the Court answered the question in the negative,
sending a message to Congress that if it thought trade secret law
worth preempting it ought to do so expressly. 24 5 Observing that
"Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the wisdom
of allowing the States to enforce trade secret protection," 246 the Court
went on to find that trade secret law performed an important function
by deterring commercial impropriety. A few scholars and practicing
lawyers no doubt continue to advance the claim that uniformity and
consistency in interpretation demand the federalization of trade secret
law, and as a result almost completely ignore the virtues of the
244. For work on the issue of federal preemption in intellectual property law, see Howard B.
Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of
State Law Protection, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 509, 580-81 (arguing section 301 of the Copyright Act
has frustrated the intent of Congress to create a uniform federal system and the standards for
copyright preemption must therefore be reformulated); Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property
Law and the Economics of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 1009 (1991) (arguing the propriety
of preemption can be determined by analyzing the goals and balances struck by federal law
reflected in the economics of patents, copyrights, and trademarks); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 150
(1999) (emphasizing the limits of preemption in resolving the conflict between freedom of
contract and intellectual property policy); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the
ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 91 (1997) (arguing that
Congress should clarify its intent regarding which copyright rules are immutable, but absent
such clarification, courts should reference market considerations by analogy to other areas of the
law to inform their decisions); Rothman, supra note 55, at 265 (contending that "[c]ourts must
preempt the right of publicity when it is based solely on persona, is used to thwart a copyright
holder's lawful exercise of rights to which the publicity holder consented, or when the Copyright
Act explicitly permits the use at issue"); Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to
First Principles of Intellectual Property Law to Determine the Issue of Federal Preemption, 12
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 357 (2008) (arguing it is the fact that state law "does not
unduly restrict free competition in information" that saves it from federal preemption).
245. 416 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1974).
246. Id. at 493.
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common law process. 247 Not surprisingly, these proposals have seen
little success in practice.248
The same holds true of other forms of common law intellectual
property. In enacting the preemption provisions of the 1976 Copyright
Act, Congress expressly observed that publicity rights and trade
secrets were "evolving" doctrines and outside the purview of copyright
preemption as long as they continued to differentiate themselves from
traditional copyright law-an indirect reference to their
adaptability. 2 4 9 Additionally, in relation to the misappropriation
doctrine, Congress observed that state law should continue to have the
"flexibility" needed to afford a remedy to plaintiffs when needed,
referring specifically to the "traditional principles of equity."2 50 These
references clearly illustrate that, while subject matter certainly was
important in Congress's exclusion of these regimes from the reach of
federal preemption, their structural attributes were equally important
and recognized as independently beneficial. The congressional
"silence" that the Court spoke of in Kewanee was thus followed by an
unequivocal endorsement of the continuing utility of these regimes in
structural and functional terms. 25 1
The marginality of common law intellectual property is thus
hardly a consequence of its structural features. The argument here
accepts the reality that common law intellectual property regimes
tend to get insufficient attention in discussions of the subject. While
the federalization of intellectual property and the decline of federal
general common law as a stand-alone body may have contributed to
this, the argument's principal objective has been to show that this
marginalization has ignored the lawmaking processes that these
247. See, e.g., David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 770-71 (2009); Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade
Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1633 (1998); Christopher Rebel
J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 442-43 (1995);
Carole P. Sadler, Federal Copyright Protection and State Trade Secret Protection: The Case for
Partial Preemption, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 667, 669, 671-74 (1984).
248. Besides congressional inaction in the area, it is also interesting to note that in its most
recent report on the subject, the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA)
recommended against the federalization of trade secret law, after reviewing multiple proposals to
the contrary. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Ass'N, REPORT OF THE TRADE SECRETS COMMITTEE 2
(2007), available at http://www.aipla.org/MSTemplate.cfm?Section=Proposal-toFederalize_
TradeSecretLaw&Site=TradeSecret Law&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.c
fm&ContentlD=7041. One of the principal reasons that the report cites for its conclusion is the
need to allow states to develop their local economies by adapting the law to the needs of their
individual marketplaces. Id. at 7. This most certainly is an allusion to the inherent adaptability
of trade secret law, and the benefits of a 'no one size for all' approach to the subject.
249. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.
250. Id.
251. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 493.
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regimes employ. Congress clearly sees some virtue in these lawmaking
processes, as evidenced by its actions in carving out a distinct space
for them. Recognizing and accepting the marginality of what these
regimes cover (that is, their subject matter) does not translate into a
denunciation of their lawmaking processes.
Perhaps most importantly though, the normative goal of this
Article has been to show that the common law method of rulemaking
that these regimes use is suitable for a host of other intellectual
property contexts-whether federal or state, entirely common law
based, or interwoven with statutory provisions. The claim uses
common law intellectual property to illustrate the functioning of this
method; yet, the method itself is hardly tied to these regimes. It is
possible to reconstruct the existing common law parts of the federal
intellectual property regimes such as the fair use doctrine in positive
terms along nearly identical lines.252
C. Courts and Their Deficiencies
A last possible objection is also perhaps the strongest, since it
looks to the practical side of pragmatic incrementalism. This is that
the defense of pragmatic incrementalism in common law intellectual
property pays insufficient attention to the problems associated with
looking to courts for rule generation. These shortcomings are said to
derive from: (1) questions of judicial competence, whether judges are
capable of making the policy decisions that intellectual property law
demands; and (2) the problem of dividing responsibility between judge
and jury in the adjudicatory process, an enduring problem of the
adjudicatory process. The analysis below examines each issue and its
significance for intellectual property as it relates to some of my
previous claims about pragmatic incrementalism.
252. The fair use doctrine was originally the creation of courts. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (holding that in determining whether a use is
permitted, the court must consider "the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity
and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work"). Yet, in drafting the current
version of the doctrine, contained in 17 U.S.C. § 107, Congress again clearly recognized that "the
endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases
precludes the formulation of exact rules" and that "courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to
particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680. Indeed, the method that courts have used to develop the doctrine is worthy
of independent analysis along the lines carried out here.
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1. Competence
The argument from competence has two parts to it. The first is
the claim that since common law intellectual property tends to be
state law, state courts may not be as well equipped and competent as
their federal counterparts, given that a large number of states appoint
judges through elections or other political processes. 253 This objection
is of limited significance for my claim here, since as noted before,
nothing in my defense of pragmatic incrementalism ties it to state
courts.2 54 Indeed the broader normative goal of the project is to have
federal law (and courts) internalize some of the methods that state
courts developed and routinely apply. We may therefore move on to
the second part, which is the more generic claim that courts, whether
federal or state, are less competent than legislatures or indeed
administrative agencies in dealing with matters of a specialized
nature, of which intellectual property law is clearly a subset.
The claim that specialization and complexity necessitate less
judicial involvement is hardly true of a host of other areas. Tort law,
antitrust law, and several other areas exhibit similar levels of
complexity, and yet have for ages been handled and developed
principally by courts. This is no less true of intellectual property law
in general, where generalist courts have always arbitrated disputes
and on occasions moved the law along incrementally. Additionally, the
intellectual property system's one experiment with a specialized court
for patent law has hardly been a runaway success, with many
questioning the wisdom behind allowing a specialized court to develop
its jurisprudence independent of the general corpus of law and legal
reasoning that applies to other areas. 255 When complexity is indeed an
issue, and requires the input of experts from different disciplines, the
answer may lie in fostering a greater role for administrative agencies
in the lawmaking process, to collaborate with and inform judicial rule
development. The role of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") in
253. For an elaborate overview of the different appointment processes followed in different
state courts, see Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States' Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J.
1077, 1079-86 (2007).
254. See supra p. 1551.
255. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 25 (1989) (discussing the concern that specialization would lead to
inferior law because "channeling cases to a single forum" would decrease the "percolation of ideas
within the judiciary"); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1108-10 (2004) (arguing
the Federal Circuit has not yet achieved its mandate of a clearer, more coherent, more
predictable legal infrastructure for the resolution of patent cases, but is on the trajectory to
achieve it in the future).
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developing antitrust law might in this context represent a model to
follow. 2 56 Antitrust law, much like common law intellectual property,
is principally the creation of courts through the common law process.
Yet, the FTC issues guidelines, studies, and instructions on different
areas and industries, to which courts routinely look (and often defer)
in their analysis and development of the law.2 5 7 The answer may thus
lie in more agency involvement rather than attempting to take the
primary task of lawmaking away from courts and handing it back to
legislatures.
As this argument has emphasized throughout, adopting
pragmatic incrementalism as an approach to lawmaking does not
necessarily entail abjuring all reliance on legislation. Indeed the
common law regimes discussed previously have come to reflect that
reality, with many of them now being codified in different forms. The
answer thus lies in a collaborative lawmaking exercise, with
legislatures or agencies providing concrete, specialized rules when
needed, and courts having a greater say in developing parts of the law
that are best suited to incremental antifoundational development.
Indeed, as some have argued, a similar collaborative model existed
early in the development of copyright law, before the system turned
entirely to statutory reform for solutions.258
2. Judge/Jury
A second problem that might be identified in the account of
pragmatic incrementalism is that it elides the division of
responsibility between judge and jury in the decisionmaking process.
In various other common law contexts, most notably tort law, the
judge-jury divide continues to be an issue that plays a rather
significant role in influencing the shape and direction of the law. In
order to vest decisionmaking either with the jury or to take it away
from them, questions of law and fact tend to be framed in terms that
complicate the doctrinal framework. 259 The issue of causation in
256. See generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY (1980) (providing an overview of the FTC's transformation
and its effects on antitrust policy).
257. For a recent overview of this interaction by the FTC Commissioner, see J. Thomas
Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the Berlin Forum on EU-US Legal-Economic
Affairs: Thoughts on the FTC's Relationship (Constitutional and Otherwise) to the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Branches, (Sept. 19, 2009), http:// www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/090919
roschberlinspeech.pdf.
258. Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1061-62 (2002).
259. See James Fleming, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J.
667, 679-85 (1949) (describing the ways by which this division is achieved in accident law, and
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negligence law is a good example of this phenomenon, where the
bifurcation of proximate cause and cause-in-fact often complicates the
inquiry. 260 The same is likely to happen with intellectual property
cases as well, should lawmaking come to increasingly rely on courts.
The proper role of juries in intellectual property cases has thus
far received little systematic attention, even under existent law. 2 6 1 In
patent cases for instance, the Federal Circuit itself has advocated a
case-by-case approach to determining which issues are purely factual
and therefore legitimately delegated to juries. 2 6 2 Yet, one recent study
reveals that litigants and lawyers tend to adhere to the popular view
that juries are incompetent when it comes to dealing with complex
legal issues. 263
The ideal division of responsibility between judge and jury will
no doubt remain an issue with an increased role for courts in
intellectual property. As such however, it is unlikely to interfere with
their reliance on the method of pragmatic incrementalism developed
here. This is so for two interconnected reasons. First, as a method of
lawmaking, pragmatic incrementalism emphasizes techniques and
approaches that are entirely within the exclusive domain of a judge's
role in providing a reasoned decision. Building on legal pragmatism,
its central premise remains the importance of forward-looking
adjudication that pays close attention to future consequences and the
guidance function of the law. Juries, by contrast, tend to focus on
elements in a particular case, thus engaging in a largely backward-
looking exercise. Second, appellate courts almost always carry out this
method of incremental rule development in an effort to provide lower
courts with guidance for the future. In other words, pragmatic
the problems that accompany it); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula
Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 854-56 (2001)
(examining the appropriate role of juries in negligence cases).
260. Leon Green, Jury Trial and Proximate Cause, 35 TEX. L. REV. 357, 358-59 (1957).
261. For notable exceptions in the patent context, see Gary M. Hnath & Timothy A. Molino,
The Roles of Judges and Juries in Patent Litigation, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 15, 17 (2009) (analyzing
the role of juries in patent cases); Jennifer F. Miller, iBrief, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent
Cases?, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0004, at 1 (discussing the constitutionality of a "complexity
exception" to the right to a jury trial in patent cases, under which there would be no such right
where the complexity of the facts or legal issues of the case is so great that it is impossible for the
jury to render a fair and reasonable verdict); Kimberly A. Moore, Juries, Patent Cases, & a Lack
of Transparency, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 801 (2002) (examining the inadequacies of juries in
patent cases); Kimberley A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 368 (2000) [hereinafter Moore, Black Box] (studying the
patent-holder win rates in cases tried before judges and juries and finding that the data results
from her study suggest problems in the jury adjudication of patent suits).
262. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
263. Moore, Black Box, supra note 261, at 369-74.
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incrementalism, as a method of lawmaking rather than simple
adjudication, emphasizes courts working with existent precedent and
interpretatively molding the law to new situations, in the process
developing it incrementally. This remains an exercise almost always
undertaken by intermediate and final courts of appeal, in both the
federal and state systems, where the judge-jury divide becomes
irrelevant.
V. A STYLIZED EXAMPLE: THE FASHION INDUSTRY
To illustrate the lessons of common law intellectual property,
this Part looks at how a common law approach might be applied to a
setting where scholars and policymakers today disagree strongly
about the need for, and consequences of, intellectual property
protection: the fashion industry.
For decades now, the fashion industry in the United States has
been without intellectual property protection for original designs.
Because federal copyright law prohibits protection for utilitarian
articles, courts have denied protection to fashion designs by default.264
Despite this reality, the U.S. fashion industry remains vibrant.265 The
last few years have seen a renewed interest in understanding the
reasons for this phenomenon and the lessons that can be drawn from
it for intellectual property law more generally.
In an influential article, Kal Raustiala and Christopher
Sprigman argue that an examination of the fashion industry's
structure reveals that the absence of intellectual property protection
has contributed to greater innovation and creativity in designs.266
Knowing that their designs are likely to be copied and disseminated at
different price ranges induces designers to generate new designs with
greater rapidity than they would have had to without such copying.
They propose a theory of "induced obsolescence" to explain design
houses' incentives to create. 267 The diffusion of a design to a broader
class of consumers diminishes its exclusivity, but in turn generates
264. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2008) (defining a "useful article" as "an article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information"); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 2.18 (describing copyright law's
reluctance to accord utilitarian articles protection).
265. For an early identification of this phenomenon in the legal literature, see Jonathan M.
Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual
Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1384 (2005).
266. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 178, at 1775-77.
267. Id. at 1722.
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the need to maintain that exclusivity by introducing new designs upon
such diffusion. Raustiala and Sprigman thus observe:
As a design is copied by others and used in less-expensive derivative works, it becomes
more widely purchased. Past a certain inflection point, the diffusion of the design erodes
its positional value, and the fashion item becomes anathema to the fashion-conscious.
This drives status-seekers to new designs in an effort to distinguish their apparel
choices from those of the masses. 2 6 8
Thus, the differentiated nature of the market for fashion designs and
the diffusion it effectuates by lowering the price of copies is central to
their explanation.269
Contrast this with the story that Scott Hemphill and Jeannie
Suk tell about the same phenomenon. 270 Advocating a cultural
approach to law and economics, 271 they argue that the absence of
intellectual property protection cannot but diminish the incentive of
fashion houses to innovate and create new designs, and that a world
with such protection would see even more innovation. 272 They thus
observe that "fashion is relevantly similar to other areas of creative
production, and we expect designers to respond to economic incentives
in the usual way." 2 73 Relying on the effects of copying on innovation in
other areas of creative production, reports on the effectiveness of the
Fashion Originators Guild in curbing piracy in the industry, and the
reality that the industry remains divided on the question of
intellectual property protection, they advocate the creation of tailored
copyright protection for fashion designs. 274 Hemphill and Suk's idea of
"tailoring," though, involves varying the standard of substantial
similarity, so as to allow protection only for identical copies and not
those that have "substantial difference [s]."275
Both sides, however, pay insufficient attention to the
importance of the segmented nature of the market for fashion. While
Raustiala and Sprigman observe how copying occurs in all segments of
the industry,276 their theory of diffusion seems contingent on the
importance of copying by actors in a lower segment of the industry.
Hemphill and Suk on the other hand presume that the mere ability to
268. Id. at 1721.
269. See id. at 1693-94 (describing the existence of a "fashion pyramid").
270. C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61
STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).
271. Id. at 1154.
272. Id. at 1153, 1180.
273. Id. at 1193.
274. Id. at 1174-80, 1193-4, 1151.
275. Id. at 1188.
276. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 178, at 1705 (stating that copying in the fashion
design industry is "ubiquitous").
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prevent the copying of a design, regardless of who is performing the
copying, is likely to provide an incentive to create.277
If both sides are to be believed-that diffusion does indeed spur
rapid innovation, and that market exclusivity contributes to the
incentive to create and innovate-reform proposals ought to pay closer
attention to the idea of "direct competition." A regime that prevents
copying only in the context of direct competition in the same segment
of the market would at once both allow the incentives argument to
have some play, and at the same time enable the process of diffusion
to continue, spreading fashion more widely and making it accessible to
a broader class of consumers. Surprisingly, neither set of authors
mentions the common law doctrine of misappropriation as a way
forward, when one of the earliest attempts to provide the fashion
industry with some protection involved an attempt to extend the
doctrine. In Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp.,278 the Second Circuit
considered the argument that the common law doctrine of
misappropriation allowed a fashion designer to preclude the copying of
a design by a competitor, for such time as the design held value, the
limited duration of a fashion cycle.279 Even so, Judge Learned Hand
was particularly dismissive of common law misappropriation in his
opinion, describing it as an act of "solecism," and dismissing the
plaintiffs claims because of his disdain for the doctrine. 280 While state
courts have since resurrected the doctrine, hardly anyone has since
analyzed its suitability for the fashion industry. The common law
doctrine of misappropriation, developed using the methods of
pragmatic incrementalism, might indeed provide the fashion industry
with a tailored, low social cost mechanism of protection.
The misappropriation doctrine is likely to protect a fashion
design only as long as the design is time-sensitive, which is usually the
duration of a fashion cycle, as reflected in the plaintiffs claim in
277. Hemphill & Suk, supra note 270, at 1180. What is additionally surprising is that
Hemphill and Suk fail to note that this was the finding of one of the earliest attempts to
understand the role of economic incentives in the fashion industry. See Barnett, supra note 265,
at 1382 ("[T]he incentive thesis still rests on another vulnerable factual assumption: namely,
that third-party imitators necessarily take away sales that would have been captured by the
innovator, therefore reducing the innovator's expected return ex post and its investment
incentives ex ante.").
278. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
279. Id. at 279-80.
280. Id. at 280. For more recent criticism of the misappropriation doctrine, alluding to
institutional design concerns inherent in it, see Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40
Hous. L. REV. 621, 632-41 (2003).
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Cheney Brothers and in the literature on the industry.281 Additionally,
any protection is likely to be only against copying by a direct
competitor. But who exactly is a direct competitor? The stratified
nature of the fashion industry is unlikely to make this hard to
determine. Forever 21 or H&M aren't competing in the same segment
of the market as Chanel and Gucci, but would nonetheless be
considered competitors inter se. Courts undertake precisely this
analysis in the antitrust context when asked to determine the
"relevant market" for a product or service. The determination
commonly involves the use of cross-elasticity of demand or similar
variables for the analysis. 282
Using common law misappropriation for fashion designs would
also exhibit several strains of pragmatic incrementalism:
Caution: The use of misappropriation would enable courts to
develop protection tentatively. By avoiding the in rem nature of
property, and tailoring the entitlement to operate only against a
narrowly defined class of defendants, the regime would have little
effect on the public. Additionally, should it prove to impede creativity
over time, courts would be able to tailor it further, or have a basis by
which to roll back the regime.
Value Pluralism: The use of misappropriation instead of a full-
blown property regime would also amount to recognition of the
multiplicity of interests at work in the regime, beyond just the
incentives of fashion designers. The social utility of copying,
distributive values, reputational elements, and other fairness concerns
would have a legitimate place in the regime. For instance, in relation
to the misappropriation doctrine, courts have occasionally relaxed the
element of direct competition when the subject matter involved is so
intricately tied to a plaintiff that its use by a defendant isn't
anticompetitive merely because of its incentive effects, but also
because it appropriates the reputation and identity of the creator. 283
Tailoring Through Custom: A misappropriation-based regime
is also likely to allow for a good degree of contextual tailoring. The
281. See, e.g., PAUL H. NYSTROM, EcONOMIcS OF FASHION 18-36 (1928) (describing the wave-
like movement of a normal fashion cycle in which the fashion rises, peaks, and then declines in
popular acceptance and factors which influence this cycle); Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Design
Innovation and Fashion Cycles, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 771, 785-87 (1995) (discussing the cyclical
nature of fashion and factors influencing it).
282. See PHILIP AREEDA & LOuIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES
572-73 (4th ed. 1988) (discussing the definition of a relevant market for purposes of antitrust
law).
283. See U.S. Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1039 (3d Cir.




regime as a whole would be modeled on an equilibrium of inter-
segment copying currently prevalent in the fashion industry.284
Additionally, elements internal to the regime could be adapted to the
unique needs of the industry, as they change over time. Thus, the idea
of "time-sensitivity," contingent on the duration of a fashion season
may come to be modified, should the fashion industry decide to adopt
additional fashion cycles, or conversely go from multiple cycles to a
single one for a calendar year. Further, the regime could also come to
incorporate exceptions for copying, when the copying itself conforms to
what Hemphill and Suk describe as following a "trend."285 Customary
practices such as trends are likely to inform courts' understanding of
copying, in working the regime, and will indeed at times caution
against affording a plaintiff any kind of protection.
Ex Ante/Ex Post Integration: If modeled on the "hot news"
doctrine that courts currently use for misappropriation, the regime
would also require courts to balance and integrate the ex ante and the
ex post. Instead of simply assuming that every instance of copying is
likely to interfere with the incentive to create, it would have courts
examine the circumstances under which the copying was done, and
also the commercial significance of a plaintiffs motives for creation.
Courts would thus have the option of denying a plaintiff protection if
they were to conclude that allowing the copying is unlikely to have
any impact on the original incentive to create.
In all the debates about intellectual property for fashion
designs, no one seems to have thought of looking to the common law
for any guidance. All the proposals to date have relied extensively on
statutory formulations of a copyright-like in rem entitlement, with
predetermined carve-outs. 28 6 "Tailoring," though, ought to mean more
than just industry-specific legislation that leaves little room for courts
to maneuver as socioeconomic circumstances change. Regardless of
whether the law originates at the federal or state level, discussions
would do well to look to the common law doctrine of misappropriation,
and its use of a flexible, contextual approach to protection, as a viable
option.
284. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 178, at 1718 (describing the allowance for
appropriation in the fashion industry as a "stable equilibrium").
285. Hemphill & Suk, supra note 270, at 1159-61.
286. See, e.g., Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. § 2(d) (2007); Design
Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th Cong. § 2(d) (2007).
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CONCLUSION
In describing the virtues of the common law's method of
incremental rule development, Richard Epstein once noted that it "has
hidden resources that are all too easily overlooked by scholars who
start with some grand claim" for the institution.287 Nowhere is this
phenomenon more apparent than in the world of intellectual property
law, long thought to be entirely about federal statutory regimes that
center around one or more core values. In their focus on these regimes,
discussions of the subject have altogether ignored the utility and
significance of common law intellectual property-and, as I have
argued, without sufficient justification.
Pragmatic incrementalism, the method of lawmaking that
common law intellectual property regimes employ, influences both the
structure and content of the law. As a form of common law rule
development, it generates rules and principles from within the reality
of a bilateral dispute presented to a court. Additionally, it emphasizes
the virtues of beginning the process without looking to an abstract
theory to justify the outcome, of focusing on the context for a rule, of
understanding the short- and long-term consequences of a rule, and of
proceeding with caution, one case at a time. These virtues can indeed
be identified with several techniques that courts routinely adopt when
applying and developing common law intellectual property rules. The
continued vitality and robustness of these regimes under state law is
in many ways a result of courts' use of these techniques to address
many of the substantive and structural issues that continue to haunt
traditional intellectual property.
The working of pragmatic incrementalism in common law
intellectual property also serves to highlight the reality that some
areas of law-such as intellectual property-may stand to benefit
more from attempts to develop theories of lawmaking rather than just
law. Focusing on the lawmaking process is more than just a
procedural concern, for, as we have seen, the common law's structure
of lawmaking greatly influences the substantive content of the law
that courts develop and apply. Discussions and debate in intellectual
property law would perhaps gain considerably from greater attention
to the institutional process by which its entitlements are created and
enforced in practice.
For centuries now, courts, policymakers, and scholars from a
multitude of disciplines have struggled, without success, to articulate
a coherent theoretical justification for intellectual property-one that
287. Epstein, supra note 29, at 73.
2010] 1615
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
does justice to the myriad interests and values that are central to it.
This reality has long been taken to represent a fundamental failing of
the subject. Yet, as I have argued, this theoretical incoherence ought
to be seen instead as a starting point for a common law analysis of the
subject, one that focuses on what parties affected by the law seek in
practice, and the multi-faceted ways in which courts balance, limit,
and help realize these needs on a nuanced basis over time, allowing
the area of law as a whole to "work itself pure."2 88
288. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 506
(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
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